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Abstract
We present new results in the areas of cryptography and voting systems.
1. Pattern matching encryption: We present new, general definitions for queryable
encryption schemes – encryption schemes that allow evaluation of private queries
on encrypted data without performing full decryption. We construct an efficient
queryable encryption scheme supporting pattern matching queries, based on
suffix trees. Storage and communication complexity are comparable to those
for (unencrypted) suffix trees. The construction is based only on symmetric-key
primitives, so it is practical.
2. Strategic equivalence of range voting and approval voting: We study strategic
voting in the context of range voting in a formal model. We show that under
general conditions, as the number of voters becomes large, strategic range voting
becomes equivalent to approval voting. We propose beta distributions as a new
and interesting way to model voter’s subjective information about other votes.
3. Statistical robustness of voting rules: We introduce a new notion called “sta-
tistical robustness” for voting rules: a voting rule is statistically robust if, for
any profile of votes, the most likely winner of a sample of the profile is the
winner of the complete profile. We show that plurality is the only interesting
voting rule that is statistically robust; approval voting (perhaps surprisingly)
and other common voting rules are not statistically robust.
Thesis Supervisor: Ronald L. Rivest
Title: Viterbi Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis presents new results in two areas: cryptography and voting systems. In the
area of cryptography, we construct an efficient pattern matching encryption scheme.
In the area of voting systems, we study strategic voting in the context of range and
approval voting. We also propose a new property for voting systems, called statistical
robustness. We describe each of these three contributions in turn.
1.1 Pattern Matching Encryption
In traditional notions of encryption, a message is encrypted with a key to produce a
ciphertext, and then only the owner of the corresponding secret key can decrypt the
ciphertext. The decryption process is “all-or-nothing”, in the sense that the secret
key owner can decrypt the message, and anyone without the secret key can learn
nothing about the message. However, modern applications of encryption often call
for more expressive notions of encryption, where data can be encrypted in such a way
that allows certain kinds of querying on the data, without decrypting the data.
In the first part of the thesis, we construct a pattern matching encryption scheme
– an encryption scheme that supports pattern matching (substring search) queries.
To motivate this work, we consider a scenario where a client has a large amount of
sensitive genomic data. The client would like to outsource storage of the sensitive
data, in encrypted form, to the cloud. Later, the client would like to make use of the
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data, for example by making queries to check whether certain cancer markers appear
anywhere as substrings of the genomic data, without having to download and decrypt
all of the data. The client would like that the server not learn too much information
about the genomic data or about the search strings. In addition, the encryption and
queries should be efficient. In our work, we specifically consider pattern matching
queries – that is, given a pattern string p and a data string s, return all occurrences
of p as a (contiguous) substring of s.
Related work. Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) [19] encrypts data in a way
that allows keyword searching, where the keywords are known ahead of time, and data
is tagged with its keywords when it is encrypted. In our setting, the space of strings
that can be searched for is all possible strings of length up to the length of the data; if
a string were to be tagged with all of its substrings when it is encrypted, ciphertexts
would grow quadratically (rather than linearly) with the size of the input.
Predicate encryption (also known as functional encryption [8]) allows the secret
key owner to generate “tokens” for various predicates, so that a token for a predicate
f can be evaluated on a ciphertext that is an encryption of m to determine whether
f(m) is satisfied. State-of-the-art predicate encryption schemes (e.g., [36, 50]) support
inner-product queries; that is, f specifies a vector v, and f(m) = 1 if 〈m, v〉 = 0.
Applying an inner product predicate encryption scheme naively to construct a pattern
matching encryption scheme, where the patterns can be of any length, would result
in ciphertexts and query time that are O(nn), where n is the length of the string s,
which is clearly impractical.
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), beginning with the breakthrough work of
Gentry [30] and further developed in subsequent work, e.g., [11, 10, 31], allows one to
evaluate any arbitrary circuit on encrypted data without being able to decrypt. FHE
would solve the pattern matching encryption problem, but existing constructions are
far from efficient enough to be practical.
The closest related work is that of structured encryption [15], which allows specific
types of queries on encrypted data structures, by “translating” a data structure that
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allows efficient querying into an encrypted setting, in a way that the efficiency is
comparable to that of the unencrypted setting. In constructing our pattern matching
encryption scheme, we take a very similar approach.
Contribution. We formalize a paradigm called “queryable encryption”, which gen-
eralizes previous definitions in the area. Queryable encryption describes encryption
that allows private, efficient querying of the data. The definition is general and does
not restrict the particular query functionality supported. Furthermore, it allows for
some information “leakage” that the server may learn from the ciphertext and from
the query protocol. The definition also allows the query protocol to be interactive.
Leakage and interactivity can be helpful in achieving an efficient scheme. We define
security using a simulation-based definition, which states precisely what the leakage
consists of, and guarantees that nothing other than the specified leakage is learned
by the server (adversary). (The idea of allowing leakage in this manner was seen
previously in work on structured encryption [15] and to some extent in work on
searchable encryption [19].) We give definitions of correctness and security against
both honest-but-curious and malicious adversaries.
We construct a pattern matching encryption scheme that satisfies correctness and
security against malicious adversaries. Encryption time is O(λn) and query time is
O(λm + k), where λ is the security parameter, n is the length of the string that is
encrypted, m is the length of the pattern string, and k is the number of occurrences
of the pattern as a substring of the original string. The query protocol takes three
rounds of communication between the client and the server. The pattern matching
encryption scheme provides efficiency comparable to that of unencrypted pattern
matching using suffix trees, a data structure that supports pattern matching with
pre-processing time O(n) and search time O(m+ k).
Our construction is based on suffix trees. We use standard symmetric-key prim-
itives (symmetric-key encryption schemes, pseudorandom functions, and hash func-
tions), as well as the following tools: (1) authenticated encryption [38, 6, 5], which
guarantees that an adversary given encryptions of messages of its choice cannot gen-
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erate new ciphertexts that it hasn’t seen, (2) which-key-concealing encryption [1, 25],
which guarantees that an adversary cannot tell whether two messages are encrypted
under the same key or different keys, and (3)Rabin-Karp rolling hash [35], a hash that
can be computed efficiently on a sliding window of input, reusing computation from
the previous window. Since all the operations are based on symmetric-key primitives,
the resulting construction is fairly practical.
1.2 Strategic Range and Approval Voting
In the next part of the thesis, we turn our attention to voting systems. A voting
system, or voting rule, specifies what types of ballots or votes can be cast, and
how to aggregate those ballots to determine an election outcome. We consider
strategic behavior in the context of voting systems. Specifically, we consider two
voting systems, range voting [53] and approval voting [13]. In range voting, each
voter gives each alternative a score in some pre-specified range. In approval voting,
each voter “approves” or “disapproves” of each candidate. Effectively, approval voting
is a special case of range voting, where there are only two allowable scores. We are
interested in how rational, strategic voters vote when using range voting and approval
voting. Our main question is, when using range voting, when would a rational voter
want to vote “approval-style” (i.e., giving each candidate either the minimum or the
maximum allowed score)? Put another way, when is strategic range voting equivalent
to approval voting?
Previous results by Smith and others (see Smith [52, 51] for a summary) showed
that strategic range voting is equivalent to approval voting when the number of voters
is large and under an assumption about the behavior of “near-tie” probabilities. How-
ever, they do not give a characterization of formal, general conditions under which
this assumption may hold.
Contribution. We study strategic range voting in a very general model of voter’s
information about the other votes. We propose that a voter has independent prob-
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ability density functions fi for each alternative i, specifying the distribution of the
average score given to that alternative. Given the fi’s, we give a method for a voter
to determine an optimal (utility-maximizing) vote. We show that, as long as the fi’s
are defined on the entire range of allowable scores, then as the number of voters grows
large, a rational range voter will want to vote approval-style.
Next, we propose a concrete class of distributions that might reasonably be used
to model a voter’s information – beta distributions. A beta distribution models a
posterior probability distribution on the average score for an alternative after seeing
a given number of approvals and disapprovals from pre-election polls, given a uniform
prior. We observe that an optimal strategy when using beta distributions to model
voter information is not always sincere – that is, it might be in the voter’s best interest
to approve of alternative Ai and disapprove of alternative Aj even though she prefers
Aj to Ai.
1.3 Statistical Robustness of Voting Rules
In the next part of the thesis, we introduce a property called statistical robustness for
voting rules.
Statistical robustness asks the following question – if a random sample is drawn
from the voter population in a given election, will the most likely election outcome
from that sample be the same as the winner for the entire population? If so, we say
that the voting system is statistically robust.
One way to think of statistical robustness is as a measure of “weather-proofness”
– if the weather is bad, and some (randomly chosen) voters don’t make it to the polls,
is the election outcome likely to be affected? From this perspective, it is clear that
statistical robustness is a desirable property for a voting system to satisfy.
Statistical robustness is relevant in the context of post-election auditing, which
attempts to check that the election outcome is correct, i.e., a full hand recount would
give the same outcome as the announced outcome. Some existing audit methods,
known as ballot-polling auditing [43], work well for voting rules like plurality, where
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each ballot observed that is a vote for the reported winner can be used to increase
the confidence that the reported winner is correct. However, it is not clear how such
methods could be made to work for voting rules that are not statistically robust.
Contribution. We propose statistical robustness as an interesting and desirable
property for a voting system. We give definitions for “full” statistical robustness,
as well as parameterized definitions for various levels of statistical robustness, with
respect to three different random sampling methods: binomial sampling, and sampling
with and without replacement.
We show that plurality (and its complement, veto) and random ballot satisfy
statistical robustness, while approval, range (score) voting, single-transferable vote
(STV), plurality with runoff, Copeland, and maximin are not statistically robust
with respect to one or more of the sampling methods. Furthermore, we show that
any positional scoring rule whose score vector contains at least three distinct values
is not statistically robust, with respect to sampling with or without replacement. It
was somewhat surprising to find that approval voting is not robust, and that plurality
is essentially the only interesting voting rule that is statistically robust.
1.4 Organization
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the work on pattern matching
encryption, which is joint work with Melissa Chase, with helpful input from Ron
Rivest. Chapter 3 describes strategic range voting and approval voting, which is joint
work with Josh Benaloh and Ron Rivest. Chapter 4 describes statistical robustness
of voting rules, which is joint work with Ron Rivest.
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Chapter 2
Pattern Matching Encryption
2.1 Introduction
In traditional symmetric-key encryption schemes, a user encrypts a message so that
only the owner of the corresponding secret key can decrypt it. Decryption is “all-or-
nothing”; that is, with the key one can decrypt the message completely, and without
the key one learns nothing about the message. However, many settings, such as cloud
storage, call for encryption schemes that support the evaluation of certain classes
of queries on the data, without decrypting the data. A client may wish to store
encrypted data on a cloud server, and then be able to issue queries on the data to the
server in order to make use of the data without retrieving and decrypting the original
ciphertext.
For example, suppose a medical research lab wants to store its subjects’ genomic
data using a cloud storage service. Due to the sensitive nature of genomic data,
the data stored on the cloud must be encrypted. At the same time, the researchers
need to be able to use and query the data efficiently, for example, by making short
substring queries on the genomic data. Using a traditional encryption scheme, any
global query on the data would require retrieving and decrypting the entire original
data, negating many of the advantages of cloud storage. The owner of the data would
like that the process of performing these queries not reveal much information to the
server about the genomic data or the search strings.
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Queryable encryption. In this chapter, we formalize a type of encryption that
we call queryable encryption. A queryable encryption scheme allows for evaluation
of some query functionality F that takes as input a message M and a query q and
outputs an answer. A client encrypts a message M under a secret key and stores
the ciphertext on a server. Then, using the secret key, the client can issue a query
q by executing an interactive protocol with the server. At the end of this protocol,
the client learns the value of F(M, q). For example, for pattern matching queries, a
query q is a pattern string, the message M is a string, and F(M, q) returns the set
of indices of all occurrences of q as a substring of M .
For security, we will think of the server as an adversary trying to learn information
about the message and the queries. Ideally, we would like that an adversary that is
given a ciphertext and that engages in query protocols for several queries learns
nothing about the message or the queries. However, in order to achieve an efficient
scheme, we will allow some limited information about the message and the queries to
be revealed (“leaked”) to the server through the ciphertext and the query protocol.
We define notions of security that specify explicitly what information is leaked, and
guarantee that an adversary learns nothing more than the specified leakage. The idea
that it may be acceptable for a queryable encryption to leak some information to gain
efficiency was seen previously in the case of structured encryption [15], and to some
extent in the case of searchable encryption [19].
We define correctness and security within two adversarial models: honest-but-
curious and malicious. In the honest-but-curious model, the adversary executes the
protocol honestly but tries to learn information about the message and the queries
along the way. In the malicious model, the adversary tries to learn information,
possibly by not following the protocol honestly.
Pattern matching encryption. Next, we focus on constructing a pattern match-
ing encryption scheme, that is, a queryable encryption scheme that support pattern
matching queries – given a string s and a pattern string p, return all occurrences of
p as a substring of s. In the genomic data application, for example, researchers may
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wish to query the database to determine whether a particular cancer marker sequence
appears in any of the data.
For efficiency, our goal is for space and computation complexity to be comparable
to that of evaluating pattern matching queries in the unencrypted setting. This
means that general techniques such as fully homomorphic encryption [30, 11, 10, 31]
and functional encryption [8, 36, 50] will not be practical. By focusing on the specific
functionality of pattern matching queries, we are able to achieve a scheme with much
better efficiency.
To construct a pattern matching encryption scheme, we use suffix trees, a data
structure used to efficiently perform pattern matching on unencrypted data. We
combine basic symmetric-key primitives to develop a method that allows traversal
of select edges in a suffix tree in order to efficiently perform pattern matching on
encrypted data, without revealing significant information about the string or the
queries.
2.1.1 Related Work
Searchable encryption and structured encryption. We draw on related work
on symmetric searchable encryption (SSE) [19] and its generalization to structured
encryption [15].
These works take the approach of considering a specific type of query and identify-
ing a data structure that allows efficient evaluation of those queries in an unencrypted
setting. The construction then “translates” the data structure into an encrypted set-
ting, so that the user can encrypt the data structure and send the server a “token” to
evaluate a query on the encrypted structure. The translation is done in such a way
that the efficiency is comparable to that of the unencrypted setting.
Since the server is processing the query, the server will be able to determine the
memory access pattern of the queries, that is, which parts of memory have been
accessed, and when the same memory block is accessed again.1 The approach to
1Note that this is true even if we use fully homomorphic encryption (e.g., [30, 11, 10, 31]) or
functional encryption [8, 36, 50].
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security in SSE and structured encryption is to acknowledge that some information
will be leaked because of the memory access pattern, but to clearly specify the leakage,
and to guarantee that is the only information that the server can learn.
While the structured encryption and SSE approach is a natural one, there has
been relatively little work in this area, and the kinds of data structures and queries
supported are rather limited. In particular, existing results focus on encrypting index
data structures to support lookup queries. In our work, we extend the approach to
encrypting suffix trees to support pattern matching queries.
Predicate encryption and fully homomorphic encryption. Predicate encryp-
tion (a special case of functional encryption [8]) allows the secret key owner to generate
“tokens” for various predicates, so that a token for a predicate f can be evaluated
on a ciphertext that is an encryption of m to determine whether f(m) is satisfied.
State-of-the-art predicate encryption schemes (e.g., [36, 50]) support inner-product
queries; that is, f specifies a vector v, and f(m) = 1 if 〈m, v〉 = 0. Applying an
inner product predicate encryption scheme naively to construct a pattern matching
encryption scheme, where the patterns can be of any length, would result in cipher-
texts and query time that are O(nn), where n is the length of the string s, which is
clearly impractical.
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), beginning with the breakthrough work of
Gentry [30] and further developed in subsequent work, e.g., [11, 10, 31], allows one to
evaluate any arbitrary circuit on encrypted data without being able to decrypt. FHE
would solve the pattern matching encryption problem, but existing constructions are
far from being efficient enough to be practical.
Oblivious RAMs. The problem of leaking the memory access pattern is addressed
in the work on Oblivious RAMs [46], which shows how to implement any query in
a way that ensures that the memory access pattern is independent of the query.
There has been significant process in making oblivious RAMs efficient; however, even
the most efficient constructions to date (see, e.g., Stefanov et al. [54]) increase the
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amortized costs of processing a query by a factor of at least log n, where n is the size
of the stored data. In our setting, where we assume that the large size of the dataset
may be one of the primary motivations for outsourcing storage, a log n overhead may
be unacceptable.
Secure two-party computation of pattern matching. There have been several
works on secure two-party or multiparty computation (e.g., [20, 45]) and specifically
on secure pattern matching and other text processing in the two-party setting (see [44,
34, 29, 37, 27, 56]). This is an interesting line of work; however, our setting is rather
different. In our setting, the client has outsourced storage of its encrypted data to a
server, and then the client would like to query its data with a pattern string. The
server does not have the data string in the clear; it is encrypted. Thus, even without
considering the extra rounds of communication, we cannot directly apply secure two-
party pattern matching protocols.
Memory delegation and integrity checking. We consider both honest-but-
curious and malicious adversaries. In the case of malicious adversaries, we are con-
cerned with detecting when the adversary misbehaves, i.e., deviates from the protocol.
One way the adversary may misbehave is by returning something other than what
was originally stored on the server. Along these lines, there is related work on mem-
ory delegation (e.g., [16]) and memory checking (e.g., [22]), verifiable computation
(e.g., [7, 28]), integrity checking (e.g., [55]), and encrypted computation on untrusted
programs (e.g., [26]); the theme of these works is retrieving and computing on data
stored on an untrusted server. For our purposes, since we focus on the specific func-
tionality of pattern matching encryption in order to achieve an efficient scheme using
simple primitives, we do not need general purpose integrity checking techniques, which
can be expensive or rely on more complex assumptions.
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2.1.2 Our Results
We present a general definition of queryable encryption schemes. We give definitions
of correctness and simulation-based definitions of security with leakage, against chosen
query attacks by both honest-but-curious and malicious adversaries.
We then define pattern matching encryption as a special case of queryable encryp-
tion, and we construct a pattern matching encryption scheme and prove its correctness
and security against malicious adversaries. The pattern matching encryption scheme
is based on suffix trees. The encryption time and ciphertext size are O(λn), querying
for a pattern takes time and communication complexity O(λm + k), where n is the
length of the encrypted string, m is the length of the pattern, and k is the number of
occurrences of the pattern as a substring of the encrypted string. The query protocol
takes a constant number of rounds of communication. All operations are based only
on symmetric-key primitives, so the resulting construction is practical.
2.2 Notation and Cryptographic Primitives
We begin with some notation and definitions of cryptographic primitives that we will
use throughout the chapter.
2.2.1 Basic Notation
We write x
R← X to denote an element x being sampled uniformly at random from a
finite set X, and x← A to denote the output x of an algorithm A. We write x||y to
refer to the concatenation of strings x and y, and |x| to refer to the length of a string
x. If x = x1 . . . xn is a string of n characters, and a and b are integers, 1 ≤ a, b ≤ n,
then x[a..b] denotes the substring xaxa+1 . . . xb. We sometimes use  to denote the
empty string. In other places  will be used to denote a quantity that is negligible in
the security parameter; the intended meaning of  will be clear from context.
If T is a tuple of values with variable names (a, b, . . .), then T.a, T.b, . . . refer to the
values in the tuple. If n is a positive integer, we use [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}.
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If S is a set, P(S) is the corresponding power set, i.e., the set of all subsets of S.
We use λ to refer to the security parameter, and we assume all algorithms im-
plicitly take λ as input. A function ν : N → N is negligible in λ if for every positive
polynomial p(·) there exists an integer λp > 0 such that for all λ > λp, ν(λ) < 1/p(λ).
We let negl(λ) denote an unspecified negligible function in λ.
Following standard GMR notation [33], if p(·, ·, . . .) is a predicate, the notation
Pr[a← A; b← B; . . . : p(a, b, . . .)] denotes the probability that p(a, b, . . .) is true after
a← A, b← B, . . . are executed in order. We write AO to represent that algorithm A
can make oracle queries to algorithm O. We will assume that adversaries are stateful
algorithms; that is, an adversary A maintains state across multiple invocations by
implicitly taking its previous state as input and outputting its updated state.
If f is a function with domain D, and S ⊆ D, then f [S] denotes the image of S
under f . If F : K ×D → R is a family of functions from D to R, where K, D, and
R are finite sets, we write FK for the function defined by FK(x) = F (K, x).
2.2.2 Pseudorandom Functions and Permutations
A pseudorandom function family (PRF) is a family F of functions such that no proba-
bilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary can distinguish a function chosen randomly
from F from a uniformly random function, except with negligible advantage.
Definition 2.2.1 (Pseudorandom Function Family). Let D and R be finite sets, and
let F : {0, 1}λ×D → R be a family of functions. Let R denote the set of all possible
functions Z : D → R. F is a pseudorandom function family (PRF) if for all PPT
adversaries A,
|Pr[K R← {0, 1}λ : AFK (1λ) = 1]− Pr[Z R← R : AZ(1λ) = 1]| ≤ negl(λ) .
Similarly, a pseudorandom permutation family (PRP) is a family of functions
such that no PPT adversary can distinguish a function randomly chosen from F and
a uniformly random permutation, except with negligible advantage.
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Definition 2.2.2 (Pseudorandom Permutation Family). Let D be a finite set, and
let F : {0, 1}λ × D → D be a family of functions. Let P denote the set of all
possible permutations (one-to-one, onto functions) P : D → D. F is a pseudorandom
permutation family (PRP) if for all PPT adversaries A,
|Pr[K R← {0, 1}λ : AFK (1λ) = 1]− Pr[P R← P : AP (1λ) = 1]| ≤ negl(λ) .
2.2.3 -Almost-Universal Hash Functions
An -almost-universal hash function is a family H of hash functions such that, for any
pair of distinct messages, the probability of a hash collision when the hash function
is chosen randomly from H is at most .
Definition 2.2.3 (-Almost-Universal Hash Function). Let U and B be finite sets,
and let H : {0, 1}λ × U → B be a family of hash functions. H is -almost-universal
if for any x, x′ ∈ U , x 6= x′,
Pr[t
R← {0, 1}λ : Ht(x) = Ht(x′)] ≤  .
Let us look at an example of a known -almost-universal hash construction, which
we shall use later.
Example 2.2.4. [Polynomial hash] We view a message x as a sequence (x1, . . . , xn)
of `-bit strings. For any k in the finite field GF(2`), the hash function Hk(x) is defined
as the evaluation of the polynomial px over GF(2
`) defined by coefficients x1, . . . , xn,
at the point k. That is, Hk(x) = px(k) = Σ
n
i=1xik
i−1, where all operations are in
GF(2`).
The hash function family defined above is -almost-universal, for  = (n − 1)/2`.
To see this, suppose Hk(x) = Hk(x
′) for some x 6= x′. Then px(k) = px′(k). This
means px−x′(k) = Σni=1(xi − x′i)ki−1 = 0, where at least one of (xi−x′i) is not 0. Since
px−x′(·) is a non-zero polynomial of degree at most n− 1, it can have at most n− 1
roots. The probability that a k chosen randomly from GF(2`) will be one of the at
most n− 1 roots is at most (n− 1)/2`.
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2.2.4 PRF Composed with Almost Universal Hashing
When computing a PRF on a long input, it can be more efficient to first hash the
input down to a short string, and then apply the PRF to the hash output. If the hash
function is -almost-universal for some negligible , then the resulting construction is
still a PRF. This observation is due to Levin [42] and is known sometimes as Levin’s
trick.
The following theorem says that a PRF composed with an -almost-universal hash
function, where  is negligible, gives another PRF. A proof of this theorem has been
given previously in [21]; we include a version of that proof here, for completeness.
Theorem 2.2.5. Let p be some polynomial. Let F : {0, 1}λ × B → R be a PRF,
and let H : {0, 1}p(λ) × U → B be an -almost-universal hash function for some
 = negl(λ). Then F (H) : {0, 1}λ+p(λ) × U → R, defined by FK,t(x) = FK(Ht(x)), is
a PRF.
Proof. Let A be an adversary attacking the PRF property of F (H). We wish to
show that A’s advantage in distinguishing FK(Ht(·)) for random K, t from Z(·),
where Z is a uniformly random function from U to R, is negl(λ). To do so, we first
argue that A’s advantage in distinguishing FK(Ht(·)) from Y (Ht(·)), where Y is a
uniformly random function from B to R, is negl(λ). We then argue thatA’s advantage
in distinguishing Y (Ht(·)) from Z(·) is negl(λ). Therefore, A’s total advantage in
distinguishing FK(Ht(·)) from Z(·) is negl(λ).
By the PRF property of F , we immediately have that A’s advantage in distin-
guishing FK(Ht(·)) for a random K from Y (Ht(·)) is at most negl(λ).
Next, to see that A cannot distinguish Y (Ht(·)) for a random t from Z(·), let
x1, . . . , xq be the queries A makes to its oracle. (Without loss of generality, assume
x1, . . . , xq are distinct.) If all of the hashes Ht(x1), . . . , Ht(xq) are distinct, then
Y (Ht(·)) and Z(·) will both output q uniformly random, independent values, so A
will not be able to distinguish the two functions.
Therefore, A’s advantage in distinguishing Y (Ht(·)) from Z(·) is at most the
probability of a collision among Ht(x1), . . . , Ht(xq). Let X denote the event that a
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collision occurs among Ht(x1), . . . , Ht(xq). Since Y is a uniformly random function,
each output of Y (Ht(·)) is a uniformly random, independent value (independent of the
input and of t), until and unless X occurs. Once X occurs, the subsequent outputs
of Y (Ht(·)) do not affect the probability of X. Therefore, to analyze the probability
of X, we can think of x1, . . . , xq as being chosen before and independently of t.
There are at most q2 pairs i < j, and by the -almost universality of H, for each
pair there is at most an  probability of a collision. Thus, the probability of X is at
most q2, which is negl(p(λ)) = negl(λ).
All together, A’s distinguishing advantage is at most negl(λ).
2.2.5 Symmetric-Key Encryption
Definition 2.2.6 (Symmetric-Key Encryption). A symmetric (or symmetric-key)
encryption scheme consists of the following PPT algorithms.
Gen(1λ): The key generation algorithm takes a security parameter λ and generates
a secret key K.
Enc(K,m): The encryption algorithm takes a secret key K and a message m and
returns a ciphertext c. Note that Enc will be randomized, but we omit the
randomness as an explicit input.
Dec(K, c): The decryption algorithm is a deterministic algorithm that takes a secret
key K and a ciphertext c and returns a message m or a special symbol ⊥.
Correctness. For correctness, we require that for all λ and for all m, letting K ←
Gen(1λ), we have Dec(K,Enc(K,m)) = m.
CPA Security. We require indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext
attacks (IND-CPA), or CPA security, which is defined using the following game.
First, the challenger runs Gen(1λ) to generate a secret key K, which is kept hidden
from the adversary. Next, the adversary is allowed to make any number of queries to
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an encryption oracle Enc(K, ·). The adversary then outputs two equal-length chal-
lenge messages m0 and m1 and receives a challenge ciphertext equal to Enc(K,mb)
for a random choice of b ∈ {0, 1}. The adversary can make more queries to the en-
cryption oracle. Finally, it outputs a guess b′ of the bit b. The adversary wins the
game if b′ = b.
The adversary’s advantage is the difference between the probability that it wins the
game and 1/2 (from guessing randomly). CPA security says that no PPT adversary
can win the above game with more than negligible advantage.
Definition 2.2.7 (CPA security). A symmetric encryption scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec)
is CPA-secure if for all PPT adversaries A,
|Pr[K ← Gen(1λ); (m0,m1)← AEnc(K,·)(1λ); b R← {0, 1}; c← Enc(K,mb);
b′ ← AEnc(K,·)(c) : b′ = b]− 1/2| ≤ negl(λ) ,
where the two messages (m0,m1) output by A must be of equal length.
Which-Key Concealing. We will also require symmetric encryption schemes to
satisfy a property called which-key concealing. The which-key concealing property
was introduced by Abadi and Rogaway [1] and (under the name “key hiding”) by
Fischlin [25].
The which-key-concealing requirement says, roughly, that an adversary cannot
tell whether ciphertexts are encrypted under the same key or different keys. More
formally, which-key concealing is defined via a game, in which the adversary tries to
distinguish between the following two experiments. In one experiment, Gen(1λ) is run
twice, to generate two keys K and K ′. The adversary is given a “left” oracle Enc(K, ·)
and a “right” oracle Enc(K ′, ·), to both of which it is allowed to make any number
of queries. The adversary then outputs a bit. The other experiment is the same,
except that only one key K is generated, and both of the left and right oracles output
Enc(K, ·). The adversary’s advantage is the difference between the probability that it
outputs 1 in the two experiments. Which-key concealing says that no PPT adversary
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can win the above game with more than negligible advantage. Note that in order for
an encryption scheme to be which-key-concealing, clearly it must be randomized.
Definition 2.2.8 (Which-Key Concealing). A symmetric encryption
scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec) is which-key-concealing if for all PPT adversaries A,
|Pr[K ← Gen(1λ);K ′ ← Gen(1λ);AEnc(K,·),Enc(K′,·)(1λ) = 1]−
Pr[K ← Gen(1λ);AEnc(K,·),Enc(K,·)(1λ) = 1]| ≤ negl(λ) .
Let us now see an example of a symmetric encryption scheme that is CPA-secure
and which-key-concealing.
Example 2.2.9 (Exor). Let p be a polynomial, and let F : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ →
{0, 1}p(λ) be a PRF. The encryption scheme Exor for message space M = {0, 1}p(λ) is
defined as follows.
Gen(1λ): Let K
R← {0, 1}λ be the secret key.
Enc(K,m): Let r
R← {0, 1}λ, and output c = (r, FK(r)⊕m).
Dec(K, c): Let c = (r, x). Output m = x⊕ FK(r).
Bellare et al. [4] proved that the above scheme is CPA-secure:
Theorem 2.2.10. [4] If F is a PRF, then Exor is CPA-secure.
We will prove that Exor is which-key-concealing.
Theorem 2.2.11. If F is a PRF, then Exor is which-key-concealing.
Proof. Let A be an adversary playing the which-key-concealing game.
We first replace Exor in the which-key-concealing game with a modified scheme
E ′xor. E ′xor is the same as Exor, except that FK is replaced with a uniformly random
function R : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}p(λ). By the PRF property of F , replacing Exor with E ′xor
can change A’s advantage in the which-key-concealing game by at most a negligible
quantity.
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So, suppose A is playing the which-key-concealing game for E ′xor. Suppose A
makes a total of q queries, m1, . . . ,mq, to its encryption oracles, where each mi is a
query to either the left or the right oracle. Let (ri, xi) denote the answer to the ith
query, and let yi = xi ⊕mi.
If there are any i and j such that ri = rj and mi is a query to the left oracle while
mj is a query to the right oracle, then A will be able to distinguish whether the two
oracles use the same key based on whether yi = yj. However, if all of r1, . . . , rq are
distinct, then for any key the encryption algorithm will choose each yi as a uniformly
random, independent value, so A will gain no information about which experiment it
is in and can do no better than a random guess.
Thus, A’s advantage in winning the which-key-concealing game for E ′xor is at most
the probability that any of r1, . . . , rq are equal, which is upper bounded by q
2/2λ.
Combining this with the negligible difference inA’s advantage against E ′xor and against
Exor, we have that A’s advantage in winning the which-key-concealing game for Exor
is negligible.
Ciphertext integrity and authenticated encryption. We will also sometimes
require a symmetric encryption scheme to have a property called ciphertext integrity.
The notions of ciphertext integrity and authenticated encryption (defined below) were
introduced by [6, 38, 5]. Ciphertext integrity says, roughly, that an adversary given
encryptions of messages of its choice cannot construct any new ciphertexts that de-
crypt successfully (i.e., decrypt to a value other than ⊥).
Formally, ciphertext integrity is defined using the following game. First, the chal-
lenger runs Gen(1λ) to generate a secret key K, which is kept hidden from the
adversary. The adversary then adaptively makes a polynomial number of queries,
m1, . . . ,mq. To each query mi the challenger responds by sending ci ← Enc(K,mi) to
the adversary. Finally, the adversary outputs a value c. The adversary wins the game
if c is not among the previously received ciphertexts {c1, . . . , cq} and Dec(K, c) 6= ⊥.
We define the advantage of an adversary A in attacking the ciphertext integrity
of a symmetric encryption scheme as the probability that A wins the above game.
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Definition 2.2.12 (Ciphertext integrity). A symmetric encryption scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec)
has ciphertext integrity if for all PPT adversaries A, A’s advantage in the above game
is at most negl(λ).
Definition 2.2.13 (Authenticated encryption). A symmetric encryption scheme is
an authenticated encryption scheme if it has CPA security and ciphertext integrity.
Let us now see an example of an authenticated encryption scheme. One way to
construct an authenticated encryption scheme is “encrypt-then-MAC” [5]. (A MAC
is a message authentication code, the details of which we do not give here; instead, we
will just use the fact that a PRF defines a secure MAC.) Using encrypt-then-MAC,
one first encrypts a message m with a CPA-secure scheme to get a ciphertext c′, and
then computes a MAC of c′ to get a tag t. The ciphertext is then c = (c′, t). The
decryption algorithm verifies that t is a valid tag for c′ and then decrypts c′ using
the CPA-secure scheme. In the following example, we apply encrypt-then-MAC to
Exor to obtain an authenticated encryption scheme Exor-auth (which, like Exor, is also
which-key-concealing).
Example 2.2.14 (Exor-auth). Let p be a polynomial, and let F : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ →
{0, 1}p(λ) and G : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ+p(λ) → {0, 1}λ be PRFs. The encryption scheme
Exor-auth for message space M = {0, 1}p(λ) is defined as follows.
Gen(1λ): Choose K1, K2
R← {0, 1}λ and let K = (K1, K2) be the secret key.
Enc(K,m): Let r
R← {0, 1}λ, and output c = (r, x = FK1(r)⊕m, t = GK2(r||x)).
Dec(K, c): Let c = (r, x, t). If t 6= GK2(r||x), output ⊥. Otherwise, output m =
x⊕ FK1(r).
Theorem 2.2.15. Exor-auth is an authenticated encryption scheme.
Proof. The theorem follows directly from the following facts: (1) G is a PRF and
therefore defines a MAC, (2) Exor is CPA-secure, and (3) applying encrypt-then-MAC
to a CPA-secure scheme gives an authenticated encryption scheme [5].
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Exor-auth also retains the which-key-concealing property of Exor.
Theorem 2.2.16. Exor-auth is which-key-concealing.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the which-key-concealing proof for Exor. We first
replace Exor-auth with a modified scheme E ′xor-auth in which F and G are replaced
with random functions R1 and R2, respectively. By the PRF property of F and G,
this changes A’s advantage in winning the which-key-concealing game by at most a
negligible quantity. Now, suppose A makes q encryption queries, m1, . . . ,mq. Let
(ri, xi, ti) denote the response to the ith query, and let yi = xi⊕mi. If all of r1, . . . , rq
are distinct and all of r1||x1, . . . , rq||xq are distinct, then for any key the encryption
algorithm will choose all of the yi and ti as uniformly random, independent values,
so A will gain no information about which experiment it is in. But if all of the ri are
distinct, then so are all of the ri||xi. Therefore, A’s advantage against E ′xor-auth is at
most the probability that any of the ri are equal, which is upper bounded by q
2/2λ.
All together, A’s advantage against Exor-auth is negligible.
2.3 Queryable Encryption
We now present the main definitions for our construction.
Definition 2.3.1. A queryable encryption scheme for a message space M, a query
space Q, an answer space A, and query functionality F :M×Q→ A, consists of the
following probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms.
K ← Gen(1λ): The key generation algorithm takes a security parameter 1λ and
generates a secret key K.
CT ← Enc(K,M): The encryption algorithm takes a secret key K and a message
M ∈M, and outputs a ciphertext CT .
A ← IssueQuery(K, q) ↔ AnswerQuery(CT ): The interactive algorithms
IssueQuery and AnswerQuery compose a query protocol between a client and a
server. The client takes as input the secret key K and a query q, and the server
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takes as input a ciphertext CT . At the end of the query protocol, the client
outputs an answer A ∈ A; the server has no output. A is a private output that
is not seen by the server.
Correctness. For correctness we require the following property. For all λ ∈ N,
q ∈ Q, M ∈M, let K ← Gen(1λ), CT ← Enc(K,M), and A← IssueQuery(K, q)↔
AnswerQuery(CT ). Then Pr[A = F(M, q)] = 1− negl(λ).
This correctness property ensures correct output if all algorithms are executed
honestly. (This is the usual way in which correctness is defined for similar types
of schemes, such as searchable encryption, structured encryption, and functional en-
cryption.) However, it does not say anything about the client’s output if the server
does not honestly execute AnswerQuery, for example.
Correctness against malicious adversaries. We also consider a stronger prop-
erty, correctness against malicious adversaries, which says that the client’s output
will be correct if all algorithms are executed honestly, but the client will output ⊥ if
the server does not execute AnswerQuery honestly. Thus, the server may misbehave,
but it cannot cause the client to unknowingly produce incorrect output.
More formally, correctness against malicious adversaries requires the following.
For all PPT algorithms A, for all λ ∈ N, q ∈ Q, M ∈ M, let K ← Gen(1λ),
CT ← Enc(K,M), and A ← IssueQuery(K, q) ↔ A(CT ). If A honestly executes
AnswerQuery, then Pr[A = F(M, q)] = 1− negl(λ). If A’s differs from AnswerQuery
in its input-output behavior, then Pr[A = ⊥] = 1− negl(λ).
Discussion. Note that, although the above is called a queryable “encryption scheme”,
it does not include an explicit decryption algorithm, as the client might not ever in-
tend to retrieve the entire original message. However, we could easily augment the
functionality F with a query that returns the entire message.
Note also that typically we expect M to be quite large, while the representation
of q and F (M, q) are small, so we would like the query protocol to be efficient relative
to the size of q and F (M, q). Without such efficiency goals, designing a queryable
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encryption scheme would be trivial. AnswerQuery could return the entire ciphertext,
and IssueQuery would then decrypt the ciphertext to get M and compute F(M, q)
directly.
Our queryable encryption definition generalizes previous definitions of searchable
encryption [19] and structured encryption [15], in the following ways.
Queryable encryption allows any general functionality F . In contrast, the defi-
nition of searchable encryption is tied to the specific functionality of returning doc-
uments containing a requested keyword. Structured encryption is a generalization
of searchable encryption, but the functionalities are restricted to return pointers to
elements of an encrypted data structure. Since we allow general functionalities, our
definition is similar to those of functional encryption. The main difference between
queryable encryption and functional encryption is in the security requirements, which
we will describe in the next section.
Also, queryable encryption allows the query protocol to be interactive. In search-
able encryption, structured encryption, and functional encryption, the query protocol
consists of two algorithms TK ← Token(K, q) and A← Query(TK,CT ). The client
constructs a query token and sends it to the server, and the server uses the token and
the ciphertext to compute the answer to the query, which it sends back to the client.
We can think of these schemes has having a one-round interactive query protocol.
Our definition allows for arbitrary interactive protocols, which may allow for better
efficiency or privacy.
Because we allow the query protocol to be interactive, we do not need the server
to actually learn the answer to the query. After the server’s final message, the client
may do some additional computation using its secret key to compute the answer.
Since the server does not see the final answer, we are able to achieve stronger privacy
guarantees.
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2.4 Honest-but-Curious (L1,L2)-CQA2 Security
We first consider security in an honest-but-curious adversarial model. In this model,
we assume that the server is honest (it executes the algorithms honestly), but curious
(it can use any information it sees in the honest execution to learn what it can about
the message and queries).
Ideally, we would like to be able to guarantee that ciphertexts and query protocols
reveal nothing about the message or the queries. However, such a strict requirement
will often make it very difficult to achieve an efficient scheme.
Therefore, we relax the security requirement somewhat so that some information
may be revealed (leaked) to the server. The security definition will be parameterized
by two “leakage” functions L1,L2. L1(M) denotes the information about the message
that is leaked by the ciphertext. For any j, L2(M, q1, . . . , qj) denotes the information
about the message and all queries made so far that is leaked by the jth query.
We would like to ensure that the information specified by L1 and L2 is the only
information that is leaked to the adversary, even if the adversary can choose the
message that is encrypted and then adaptively choose the queries for which it executes
a query protocol with the client. To capture this, our security definition considers a
real experiment and an ideal experiment, and requires that the view of any adaptive
adversary in the real experiment be simulatable given only the information specified
by L1 and L2.
Following [15], we call the definition (L1,L2)-CQA2 security, where the name
“CQA2” comes from “chosen query attack” and is somewhat analogous to CCA2
(chosen ciphertext attack) for symmetric encryption schemes, where an adversary
can make decryption queries for chosen ciphertexts after receiving the challenge ci-
phertext.
Definition 2.4.1 (Honest-but-Curious (L1,L2)-CQA2 Security). Let E = (Gen,Enc,Query)
be a queryable encryption scheme for a message spaceM, a query space Q, an answer
space A, and query functionality F :M×Q→ A. Let L1 and L2 be two functions.
Consider the following experiments involving an adversary A and a simulator S:
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RealE,A(λ): The challenger begins by running Gen(1λ) to generate a secret key K.
The adversary A outputs a message M . The challenger runs Enc(K,M) to
generate a ciphertext CT , and sends CT toA. The adversary adaptively chooses
a polynomial number of queries, q1, . . . , qt. For each query qi, the challenger
sends the adversary the view vi of an honest server in the interactive protocol
IssueQuery(K, qi) ↔ AnswerQuery(CT ). Finally, A outputs a bit b, and b is
output by the experiment.
IdealE,A,S(λ): First, A outputs a message M . The simulator S is given L1(M)
(not M itself), and outputs a value CT . The adversary adaptively chooses
a polynomial number of queries, q1, . . . , qt. For each query qi, the simulator
is given L2(M, q1, . . . , qi) (not qi itself), and it outputs a simulated view vi.
Finally, A outputs a bit b, and b is output by the experiment.
We say that E is (L1,L2)-CQA2 secure against honest-but-curious adversaries if,
for all PPT adversaries A, there exists a simulator S such that
|Pr[RealE,A(λ) = 1]− Pr[IdealE,A,S(λ) = 1]| ≤ negl(λ) .
Discussion. The above definition is based heavily on the definition for structured
encryption [15] and generalizes it to interactive query protocols. It is also loosely
related to simulation-based definitions for functional encryption [8], with one impor-
tant difference: In our definition, we only consider a single ciphertext; security is not
guaranteed to hold if multiple ciphertexts are encrypted under the same key. Note
that security for only one ciphertext only makes sense in the symmetric-key setting,
since in the public-key setting one can encrypt any number of messages with the
public key. In our application, it will be reasonable to expect that each instantiation
of the scheme will be used to encrypt only one message.
Although in some applications, it may be interesting and sufficient to model the
server as an honest-but-curious adversary, often we will be interested in a stronger
adversarial model. That is, we would like to ensure privacy against even a malicious
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adversary – one that does not execute its algorithms honestly. In the next section,
we present a definition of security against malicious adversaries.
2.5 Malicious (L1,L2)-CQA2 Security
The definition of (L1,L2)-CQA2 security against malicious adversaries is similar to
the one for honest-but-curious adversaries, except for the following two differences.
First, for each query qi, in the malicious game, the adversary interacts with ei-
ther an honest challenger running IssueQuery(K, qi) in the real game, or the sim-
ulator given L2(M, q1, . . . , qi) in the ideal game. (In the honest-but-curious game,
the adversary just received the view of an honest server in the interactive protocol
IssueQuery(K, qi)↔ AnswerQuery(CT ).)
Second, at the end of the protocol for qi, the adversary outputs the description
of a function gi of its choice. In the real game, the adversary receives gi(A1, . . . , Ai),
where Aj is the private answer output by the client for query qj. In the ideal game,
the adversary receives gi(A
′
1, . . . , A
′
i), where A
′
j = ⊥ if the client output ⊥ in the
query protocol for qj; otherwise, A
′
j = F (M, qj).
This last step of the game is necessary in the malicious game because the adversary
may learn extra information based on the client’s responses to the incorrectly formed
messages from the adversary. The client’s private output, although it is not sent
to the server in the actual query protocol, can be thought of as a response to the
last message sent by the adversary. We want to capture the notion that, even if the
adversary were able to learn some function gi of the client’s private outputs A1, . . . , Ai,
it would not learn more than gi(F (M, q1), . . . , F (M, qi)). However, for any Aj = ⊥,
in the evaluation of gi, F (M, qj) is replaced by ⊥.
Definition 2.5.1 (Malicious (L1,L2)-CQA2 security). Let E = (Gen,Enc,Query) be
a queryable encryption scheme for a message space M, a query space Q, an answer
space A, and query functionality F :M×Q→ A. Let L1 and L2 be two functions.
Consider the following experiments involving an adversary A and a simulator S.
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Real’E,A(λ): The challenger begins by running Gen(1λ) to generate a secret key K.
The adversary A outputs a message M . The challenger runs Enc(K,M) to
generate a ciphertext CT , and sends CT to A. The adversary adaptively makes
a polynomial number of queries q1, . . . , qt. For each query qi, first A interacts
with the challenger, which runs IssueQuery(K, qi). Let Ai be the challenger’s
private output from the protocol for qi. Then A outputs a description of a
function gi, and it receives hi ← gi(A1, . . . , Ai). Finally, A outputs a bit b.
Ideal’E,A,S(λ): First, A outputs a message M . The simulator S is given L1(M)
(not M itself), and outputs a value CT . The adversary adaptively makes a
polynomial number of queries q1, . . . , qt. For each query qi, first the simulator is
given L2(M, q1, . . . , qi) (not qi itself), and A interacts with the simulator. Then
A outputs a description of a function gi, and it receives hi ← gi(A′1, . . . , A′i),
where A′i = ⊥ if the simulator output ⊥ in the query protocol for qi; otherwise,
A′i = F(M, qi). Finally, A outputs a bit b.
We say that E is (L1,L2)-CQA2 secure against malicious adversaries if, for all PPT
adversaries A, there exists a simulator S such that
|Pr[Real’E,A(λ) = 1]− Pr[Ideal’E,A,S(λ) = 1]| ≤ negl(λ) .
2.6 Pattern Matching Encryption
Definition 2.6.1 (Pattern matching encryption). A pattern matching encryption
scheme for an alphabet Σ is a queryable encryption scheme for:
• message space M = Σ∗,
• query space Q = Σ∗,
• answer space A = P(N), and
• query functionality F where F(s, p) is the set of indices of all the occurrences of
p as a substring of s. That is, F(s, p) = {i|s[i..i+m− 1] = p}, where m = |p|.
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2.7 Suffix Trees
Our goal is to construct a pattern matching scheme – a queryable encryption scheme
that supports the functionality F , where F(s, p) returns the indices of all occurrences
of p as a substring of s.
We first look to pattern matching algorithms for unencrypted data. There are
several known pattern matching algorithms [39, 9, 35, 2], varying in their preprocess-
ing efficiency and query efficiency. Most of these algorithms have preprocessing time
O(m) and query time O(n), where n is the length of the string s and m is the length
of the pattern p. Pattern matching using suffix trees, however, has preprocessing time
O(n) and query time O(m). This is ideal for our applications, where the client stores
one string s encrypted on the server, and performs queries for many pattern strings
p. Therefore, we will focus on pattern matching using suffix trees as the basis for our
scheme.
A suffix tree for a string s of length n is defined as a tree such that the paths
from the root to the leaves are in one-to-one correspondence with the n suffixes of s,
edges spell non-empty strings, each internal node has at least two children, and any
two edges edges coming out of a node start with different characters. For a suffix tree
for a string s to exist, s must be prefix-free; if it is not, we can first append a special
symbol $ to make s prefix-free. Figure 2-1 shows a suffix tree for an example string,
“cocoon”.
Pattern matching using suffix trees uses the following important observation: a
pattern p is a substring of s if and only if it is a prefix of some suffix of s. Thus, to
search s for a pattern p, search for a path from the root of which p is a prefix.
For a string of length n, a suffix tree can be constructed in O(n) time [57, 24].
It can be easily shown that a suffix tree has at most 2n nodes. However, if for each
node we were to store the entire string spelled on the edge to that node, the total
storage would be O(n2) in the worst case. (To see this, consider the suffix tree for the
string s1 . . . sn, where each si is unique. The suffix tree would contain a distinct edge
for each of the n suffixes s1 . . . sn, s2 . . . sn, . . . sn; these suffixes have a total length
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Figure 2-1: A suffix tree for the string s =“cocoon”. We will use the node labels
u1, . . . , u9 later to explain how the pattern matching encryption scheme works.
O(n2).) To represent a suffix tree in O(n) space, for each node u other than the root,
one stores the start and end indices into s of the first occurrence of the substring on
the edge to u. In addition, one stores the string s. Using this representation, a suffix
tree takes O(n) storage and can be used to search for any pattern p of length m in
O(m) time, and to return the indices of all occurrences of p in O(m+ k) time, where
k is the number of occurrences.
We note a few observations about suffix trees that will be useful in our construc-
tion. For any node u, let ρ(u) be the string spelled out on the path from the root to
u. The string ρ(u) uniquely identifies a node u in a suffix tree, i.e., no two distinct
nodes u and u′ have ρ(u) = ρ(u′). Let us also define ρˆ(u) to be the string spelled out
on the path from the root to the parent of u, followed by the first character on the
edge to u. Since no two edges coming out of a node start with the same character,
ρˆ(u) also uniquely identifies u. Furthermore, the set of indices in s of occurrences of
ρ(u) is exactly the same as the set indices of occurrences of ρˆ(u).
For any given string s, a suffix tree is generally not unique (the children of each
node may be ordered in any way). For the remainder of the chapter, we will assume
that when a suffix tree is constructed, the children of every node are “ordered” lex-
icographically according to some canonical order of the alphabet. Thus, for a given
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string s, we talk about the unique suffix tree for s, and we can also talk about the ith
child of a node (in a well-defined way), for example. In the example in Figure 2-1, the
suffix tree for “cocoon” is constructed with respect to the alphabet ordering (c, o, n).
In Figure 2-1, u5 and u6 are the first and second children, respectively, of u2.
2.8 Notation
Before we describe our pattern matching encryption scheme, we introduce some help-
ful notation. Some of the notation will be relative to a string s and its suffix tree
Trees, even though they are not explicit parameters.
• u: a node in Trees
• : the empty string
• par(u): the parent node of u. If u is the root, par(u) is undefined.
• child(u, i): the ith child node of u. If u has fewer than i children, child(u, i) is
undefined.
• deg(u): the out-degree (number of children) of u
• ρ(u): the string spelled on the path from the root to u. ρ(u) =  if u is the root.
• ρˆ(u): For any non-root node u, ρˆ(u) = ρ(par(u))‖u1, where u1 is the first
character on the edge from par(u) to u. If u is the root, ρˆ(u) = .
• leaf i: the ith leaf node in Trees, where the leaves are numbered 1 to n, from
left to right
• lenu: the length of the string ρˆ(u)
• indu: the index in s of the first occurrence of ρ(u) (equivalently, of ρˆ(u)) as a
substring. That is, indu is the smallest i such that ρˆ(u) = s[i..i + lenu − 1]. If
ρ(u) = , indu is defined to be 0.
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• lposu: the position (between 1 and n) of the leftmost descendant of u. That is,
leaf lposu is the leftmost leaf in the subtree rooted at u.
• numu: the number of occurrences in s of ρ(u) (equivalently, of ρˆ(u)) as a sub-
string. If ρ(u) = , numu is defined to be 0. Note that for non-root nodes u,
numu is equal to the number of leaves in the subtree rooted at u.
To illustrate the notation above, let us look at the suffix tree in Figure 2-1 for
the string “cocoon”. In this tree, we have u2 = par(u3), u3 = child(u2, 1), deg(u2) =
2, ρ(u3) = “cocoon”, ρˆ(u3) = “coc”, leaf 5 = u8, indu2 = 1, lposu2 = 1, numu2 = 2.
2.9 Intuition
Before presenting the details of our construction we provide some intuition.
Our construction will make use of a dictionary, which is a data structure that
stores key-value pairs (k, V ), such that for any key k the corresponding value V can
be retrieved efficiently (in constant time).
We will use a symmetric encryption scheme ESKE, a PRF F , and a PRP P . The
key generation algorithm will generate three keys KD,KC,KL for ESKE, and four keys
K1, K2, K3, K4. (We will explain how the keys are used as we develop the intuition
for the construction.)
First attempt. We first focus on constructing a queryable encryption scheme for
a simpler functionality F ′, where F ′(s, p) computes whether p occurs as a substring
in s, and, if so, the index of the first occurrence in s of p. We will also only consider
correctness and security against an honest-but-curious server for now.
As a first attempt, let ESKE be a CPA-secure symmetric encryption scheme, and
encrypt a string s = s1 . . . sn in the following way. First, construct the suffix tree
Trees for s. Then construct a dictionary D, where for each node u in Trees, there
is an entry with search key FK1(ρ(u)) and value ESKE.Enc(KD, indu), and let the
ciphertext consist of the dictionary D. Then, in the query protocol for a query p, the
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node key value
u1 FK1() ESKE.Enc(KD, 0)
u2 FK1(“co”) ESKE.Enc(KD, 1)
u3 FK1(“cocoon”) ESKE.Enc(KD, 1)
u4 FK1(“coon”) ESKE.Enc(KD, 3)
u5 FK1(“o”) ESKE.Enc(KD, 2)
u6 FK1(“ocoon”) ESKE.Enc(KD, 2)
u7 FK1(“oon”) ESKE.Enc(KD, 4)
u8 FK1(“on”) ESKE.Enc(KD, 5)
u9 FK1(“n”) ESKE.Enc(KD, 6)
Figure 2-2: The dictionary composing the ciphertext for the string “cocoon” in the
“first attempt” scheme. Note that the node identifiers u1, . . . , u9 are not a part of the
dictionary; they are provided for the purpose of cross-referencing with the suffix tree
in Figure 2-1.
client sends FK1(p). The server then checks whether D contains an entry with search
key FK1(p). If so, it returns D(FK1(p)), which the client decrypts using KD to get the
index of the first occurrence in s of p.
For example, for our example string “cocoon”, the ciphertext in this first attempt
would consist of the dictionary shown in Figure 2-2.
The obvious problem with this approach is that it only works for patterns that
are substrings of s that end exactly at a node; it does not work for finding substrings
of s that end partway down an edge.
Returning a possible match. To address this problem, we observe that we can
uniquely identify each node u by ρˆ(u) instead of ρ(u). Furthermore, if u is the last
node (farthest from the root) for which any prefix of p equals ρˆ(u), then either p is
not a substring of s, or p ends partway down the path to u and the indices in s of the
occurrences of ρˆ(u) are the same as the indices in s of the occurrences of p.
In the dictionary D, we will now use ρˆ(u) instead of ρ(u) as the search key for
a node u. We will say that a prefix p[1..i] is a matching prefix if p[1..i] = ρˆ(u) for
some u, i.e., there is a dictionary entry corresponding to p[1..i]; otherwise, p[1..i] is a
non-matching prefix.
The ciphertext will also include an array C of character-wise encryptions of s,
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with C[i] = ESKE.Enc(KC, si). In the query protocol, the client will send T1, . . . , Tm,
where Ti = FK1(p[1..i]). The server finds the entry D(Tj), where p[1..j] is the longest
matching prefix of p. The server will return the encrypted index ESKE.Enc(KD, ind)
stored in D(Tj). The client will then decrypt it to get ind , and request the server to
send C[ind ], . . . , C[ind +m− 1]. The client can decrypt the result to check whether
the decrypted string is equal to the pattern p and thus, whether p is a substring of s.
Returning all occurrences. We would like to return the indices of all occurrences
of p in s, not just the first occurrence or a constant number of occurrences. However,
in order to keep the ciphertext size O(n), we need the storage for each node to
remain a constant size. In a naive approach, in each dictionary entry we would store
encryptions of indices of all of the occurrences of the corresponding string. However,
this would take O(n2) storage in the worst case.
We will use the observation that the occurrences of the prefix associated with a
node are exactly the occurrences of the strings associated with the leaves in the subtree
rooted at that node. Each leaf corresponds to exactly one suffix. So, we construct a
leaf array L of size n, with the leaves numbered 1 to n from left to right. Each element
L[i] stores an encryption of the index in s of the string on the path to the ith leaf.
That is, L[i] = ESKE.Enc(KL, ind leaf i). In the encrypted tuple in the dictionary entry
for a node u we also store lposu, the leaf position of the leftmost leaf in the subtree
rooted at u, and numu, the number of occurrences of ρˆ(u). That is, the value in
the dictionary entry for a node u is now ESKE.Enc(KD, (indu, lposu, numu)) instead of
ESKE.Enc(KD, indu). The server will return ESKE.Enc(KD, (indu, lposu, numu)) for the
last node u matched by a prefix of p. The client then decrypts to get indu, lposu, numu,
asks for C[ind], . . . , C[ind + m − 1], decrypts to determine whether p is a substring
of s, and if so, asks for L[lposu], . . . , L[lposu + num − 1] to retrieve all occurrences of
p in s.
Hiding common non-matching prefixes among queries. The scheme outlined
so far works; it supports the desired pattern matching query functionality, against an
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honest-but-curious adversary. However, it leaks a lot of unnecessary information, so
we will add a number of improvements to reduce the information that is leaked.
For any two queries p and p′ whose first j prefixes are the same, the values
T1, . . . , Tj in the query protocol will be the same. Therefore, the server will learn
that p[1..j] = p[1..j′], even though p[1..j] may not be contained in s at all. Memory
accesses will reveal to the server when two queries share a prefix p[1..j] that is a
matching prefix (i.e., contained in the dictionary), but we would like to hide when
queries share non-matching prefixes.
In order to hide when queries share non-matching prefixes, we change each Ti to
be an ESKE encryption of f (i)1 = FK1(p[1..i]) under the key f (i)2 = FK2(p[1..i]). The
dictionary entry for a node u will contain values f2,i for its children nodes, where
f2,i = FK2(ρˆ(child(u, i)). Note that f2,i is the key used to encrypt Tj for any pattern
p whose prefix p[1..j] is equal to ρˆ(child(u, i)). In the query protocol, the server starts
at the root node, and after reaching any node, the server tries using each of the f2,i
for that node to decrypt each of the next Tj’s, until it either succeeds and reaches the
next node or it reaches the end of the pattern.
Hiding node degrees, lexicographic order of children, number of nodes in
suffix tree. Since the maximum degree of any node is the size d of the alphabet,
we will hide the actual degree of each node by creating dummy random f2,i values
so that there are d in total. In order to hide the lexicographic order of the children
and hide which of the f2,i are dummy values, we store the f2,i in a random permuted
order in the dictionary entry.
Similarly, since a suffix tree for a string of length n contains at most 2n nodes,
we will hide the exact number N of nodes in the suffix tree by constructing 2n −N
dummy entries in D. For each dummy entry, the search key is a random value f1, and
the value is (f2,1, . . . , f2,d,W ), where f2,1, . . . , f2,d are random and W is an encryption
of 0.
48
Hiding string indices and leaf positions. In order to hide the actual values of
the string indices ind , . . . , ind +m−1 and the leaf positions lpos , . . . , lpos + num−1,
we make use of a pseudorandom permutation family P of permutations [n] → [n].
Instead of sending (ind , . . . , ind +m− 1), the client applies the permutation PK3 to
ind , . . . , ind +m− 1 and outputs the resulting values in a randomly permuted order
as (x1, . . . , xm). Similarly, instead of sending (lpos , . . . , lpos + num − 1), the client
applies the permutation PK4 to lpos , . . . , lpos + num − 1 and outputs the resulting
values in a randomly permuted order as (y1, . . . , ynum). Note that while the server
does not learn the actual indices or leaf positions, it still learns when two queries ask
for the same or overlapping indices or leaf positions.
Handling malicious adversaries. The scheme described so far satisfies correct-
ness against an honest-but-curious adversary, but not a malicious adversary, since the
client does not perform any checks to ensure that the server is sending correct mes-
sages. The scheme also would not satisfy security against a malicious adversary for
reasonable leakage functions, since an adversary could potentially gain information
by sending malformed or incorrect ciphertexts during the query protocol.
To handle a malicious adversary, we will require ESKE to be an authenticated
encryption scheme. Thus, an adversary will not be able to obtain the decryption of
any ciphertext that is not part of the dictionary D or the arrays C or L. Also, we will
add auxiliary information to the messages encrypted, to allow the client to check that
any ciphertext returned by the adversary is the one expected by the honest algorithm.
The client will be able to detect whether the server returned a ciphertext that is in
D but not the correct one, for example.
Specifically, we will encrypt (si, i) instead of just si, so that the client can check
that it is receiving the correct piece of the ciphertext. Similarly, we will encrypt
(ind leaf i , i) instead of just ind leaf i . For the dictionary entries, in addition to indu,numu,
and lposu, we will include lenu, f1(u), f2,1(u), . . . , f2,d(u) in the tuple that is encrypted.
The client can then check whether the W sent by the adversary corresponds to the
longest matching prefix of p, by verifying that FK1(p[1..len]) = f1, and that none of
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the f2,1, . . . , f2,d successfully decrypts any of the Tj for j > len.
2.10 Pattern Matching Scheme
Let F : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ be a PRF, and let P : {0, 1}λ × [n] → [n]
be a PRP. Let ESKE = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be an authenticated, which-key-concealing
symmetric encryption scheme. Our pattern matching encryption scheme EPM for an
alphabet Σ with |Σ| = d is as follows.
Gen(1λ): Choose random strings KD,KC,KL, K1, K2, K3, K4
R← {0, 1}λ.2 The secret
key is
K = (KD,KC,KL, K1, K2, K3, K4).
Enc(K, s): Let s = s1 . . . sn ∈ Σn. Construct the suffix tree Trees for s.
1. Construct a dictionary D as follows.
For any node u, define f1(u) := FK1(ρˆ(u)) and f2(u) := FK2(ρˆ(u)).
For each node u in Trees (including the root and leaves), proceed as
follows:
• Choose a random permutation piu : [d]→ [d].
• For i = 1, . . . , d, let f2,i(u) = f2(child(u, piu(i)) if 1 ≤ piu(i) ≤ deg(u);
otherwise let f2,i(u)
R← {0, 1}λ.
• Let Xu = (indu, lposu, numu, lenu, f1(u), f2,1(u), . . . , f2,d(u)), and let
Wu = ESKE.Enc(KD, Xu).
• Store Vu = (f2,1(u), . . . , f2,d(u),Wu) with search key κu = f1(u) in D.
Let N denote the number of nodes in Trees. Construct 2n − N dummy
entries in D as follows. For each dummy entry, choose random strings
2We will assume for simplicity that ESKE.Gen simply chooses a random key k R← {0, 1}λ, so
throughout the construction we will use random values as ESKE keys. To allow for general ESKE.Gen
algorithms, instead of using a random value r directly as a key, we could use a key generated by
ESKE.Gen with r providing ESKE.Gen’s random coins.
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f1, f2,1, . . . , f2,d
R← {0, 1}λ, and store (f2,1, . . . , f2,d, ESKE.Enc(KD, 0)) with
search key f1 in D.
2. Construct an array C as follows.
For i = 1, . . . , n, compute ci = ESKE.Enc(KC, (si, i)) and set C[PK3(i)] = ci.
3. Construct an array L as follows.
For i = 1, . . . , n, compute `i = ESKE.Enc(KL, (ind leaf i , i)) and set L[PK4(i)] =
`i.
Output the ciphertext CT = (D,C, L).
IssueQuery(K, p)↔ AnswerQuery(CT ): The interactive query protocol, between
a client with K and p and a server with CT , runs as follows.
Let p = p1 . . . pm ∈ Σm, and let CT = (D,C, L).
1. The client computes, for i = 1, . . . ,m,
f
(i)
1 = FK1(p1 . . . pi), f
(i)
2 = FK2(p1 . . . pi) ,
and sets Ti = ESKE.Enc(f (i)2 , f (i)1 ).
The client sends the server (T1, . . . , Tm).
2. The server proceeds as follows, maintaining variables f1, f2,1, . . . , f2,d,W .
Initialize (f2,1, . . . , f2,d,W ) to equal D(FK1()), where  denotes the empty
string.
For i = 1, . . . ,m :
For j = 1, . . . , d:
Let f1 ← ESKE.Dec(f2,j, Ti). If f1 6= ⊥, update (f2,1, . . . , f2,d,W ) to
equal D(f1), and break (proceed to the next value of i). Otherwise, do
nothing.
At the end, the server sends W to the client.
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3. The client runs X ← ESKE.Dec(KD,W ). If X = ⊥, output ⊥ and end
the protocol. Otherwise, parse X as (ind , lpos , num, len, f1, f2,1, . . . , f2,d).
Check whether FK1(p[1..len]) = f1. If not, output ⊥ and end the pro-
tocol. Otherwise, check whether ESKE.Dec(f2,i, Tj) = ⊥ for any j ∈
{len + 1, . . . ,m} and i ∈ {1, . . . , d}. If so, output ⊥ and end the pro-
tocol. If ind = 0, output ∅. Otherwise, choose a random permutation
pi1 : [m]→ [m]. For i = 1, . . . ,m, let xpi1(i) = PK3(ind + i− 1). The client
sends (x1, . . . , xm) to the server.
4. The server sets Ci = C[xi] for i = 1, . . . ,m and sends (C1, . . . , Cm) to the
client.
5. For i = 1, . . . ,m, the client runs Y ← ESKE.Dec(KC, Cpi1(i)). If Y = ⊥,
output ⊥ and end the protocol. Otherwise, let the result be (p′i, j). If
j 6= ind + i − 1, output ⊥. Otherwise, if p′1 . . . p′m 6= p, then the client
outputs ∅ as its answer and ends the protocol. Otherwise, the client chooses
a random permutation pi2 : [num] → [num]. For i = 1, . . . , num, let
ypi2(i) = PK4(lpos + i− 1). The client sends (y1, . . . , ynum) to the server.
6. The server sets Li = L[yi] for i = 1, . . . , num, and sends (L1, . . . , Lnum) to
the client.
7. For i = 1, . . . , num, the client runs ESKE.Dec(KL, Lpi2(i)). If the result
is ⊥, the client outputs ⊥ as its answer. Otherwise, let the result be
(ai, j). If j 6= lpos + i − 1, output ⊥. Otherwise, output the answer
A = {a1, . . . , anum}.
2.11 Efficiency
In analyzing the efficiency of our construction, we will assume data is stored in com-
puter words that hold log n bits; therefore, we will treat values of size O(log n) as
constant size.
We assume encryption and decryption using ESKE take O(λ) time. Also we assume
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the dictionary is implemented in such a way that dictionary lookups take constant
time (using hash tables, for example).
Efficient batch implementation of PRFs. Assuming the evaluation of a PRF
takes time linear in the length of its input, in a naive implementation of our scheme,
computing the PRFs f1(u) and f2(u) for all nodes u would take O(n
2). This is because
even though there are only at most 2n nodes, the sum of the lengths of the strings
ρˆ(u) associated with the nodes u can be O(n2). Similarly, computing the PRFs used
for T1, . . . , Tm would take O(m
2) time.
It turns out that we can take advantage of the way the strings we are applying
the PRFs to are related, to speed up the batch implementation of the PRFs for all
of the nodes of the tree. We will use two tools: the polynomial hash (defined in
Example 2.2.4) and suffix links (described below).
To compute the PRF of a string x, we will first hash x to λ bits using the polyno-
mial hash, and then apply the PRF (which takes time O(λ) on the hashed input). In
order to efficiently compute the hashes of all of the strings ρˆ(u), we use a trick that is
used in the Rabin-Karp rolling hash (see Cormen et al. [18],e.g.). (A rolling hash is a
hash function that can be computed efficiently on a sliding window of input; the hash
of each window reuses computation from the previous window.) The Rabin-Karp
hash is the polynomial hash, with each character of the string viewed as a coefficient
of the polynomial applied to the random key of the hash. The key observation is that
the polynomial hash H allows for constant-time computation of Hk(x1 . . . xn) from
Hk(x2 . . . xn), and also of Hk(x1 . . . xn) from Hk(x1 . . . xn−1). To see this, notice that
Hk(x1 . . . , xn) = x1 + k ·Hk(x2 . . . xn), and Hk(x1 . . . xn) = Hk(x1 . . . xn−1) + xnkn−1.
Using this trick, for any string x of length `, we can compute the hashes Hk(x[1..i])
for all i = 1, . . . ,m in total time O(λm). Thus, the T1, . . . , Tm can be computed in
time O(λm).
In order to compute the hashes of ρˆ(u) for all nodes u in time O(n), we need
one more trick. Many efficient suffix tree construction algorithms include suffix links :
Each non-leaf node u with associated string ρ(u) = a||B, where a is a single character,
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has a pointer called a suffix link pointing to the node u′ whose associated string ρ(u′)
is B.
It turns out that connecting the nodes in a suffix tree using the suffix links forms
another tree, in which the parent of a node u is the node u′ to which u’s suffix link
points. To see this, notice that each internal node has an outgoing suffix link, and
each node’s suffix link points to a node with a shorter associated string of one fewer
character, so there can be no cycles.
Since ρˆ(u) = ρ(par(u))||u1, we can first compute the hashes of ρ(u) for all non-leaf
nodes u, and then compute ρˆ(u) for all nodes u in constant time from ρ(par(u)). To
compute ρ(u) for all nodes u, we traverse the tree formed by the suffix links, starting
at the root, and compute the hash of ρ(u) for each u using ρ(u′), where u′ is u’s
parent in the suffix link tree. Each of these computations takes constant time, since
ρ(u) is the same as ρ(u′) but with one character appended to the front. Therefore,
computing the hashes of ρ(u) for all non-leaf nodes u (and thus, computing the hashes
of ρˆ(u) for all nodes u) takes total time O(n).
Encryption efficiency. Using the efficient batch implementation of PRFs sug-
gested above, the PRFs f1(u) and f2(u) can be computed for all nodes u in the tree
in total time O(λn). Therefore, the dictionary D of 2n entries can be computed in
total time O(λn). The arrays C and L each have n elements and can be computed
in time O(λn). Therefore, encryption takes time O(λn) and the ciphertext is of size
O(λn).
Query protocol efficiency. In the query protocol, the client first computes T1, . . . , Tm.
Using the efficient batch PRF implementation suggested above, computing the f
(i)
1
and f
(i)
2 for i = 1, . . . ,m takes total timeO(m), and computing each ESKE.Enc(f (i)2 , f (i)1 )
takes O(λ) time, so the total time to compute T1, . . . , Tm is O(λm).
To find W , the server performs at most md decryptions and dictionary lookups,
which takes total time O(λm). The client then computes x1, . . . , xm and the server
retrieves C[x1], . . . , C[xm], in time O(m). If the answer is not ∅, the client then
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computes y1, . . . , ynum and the server retrieves L[y1], . . . , L[ynum ] in time O(num), in
time O(num). Thus, both the client and the server take computation time O(λm +
num) in the query protocol. (Since we are computing an upper bound on the query
computation time, we can ignore the possibility that the server cheats and the client
aborts the protocol by outputting ⊥.) The query protocol takes three rounds of
communication, and the total size of the messages exchanged is O(λm+ num).
2.12 Correctness Against Malicious Adversaries
We will show that EPM is correct against malicious adversaries.
Theorem 2.12.1. If ESKE is an authenticated encryption scheme, then EPM is correct
against malicious adversaries.
Proof. It is fairly straightforward to see that if the adversary executes AnswerQuery
honestly, then the client’s output will be correct.
We will argue that for each of the places where A could output an incorrect value,
the client will detect A’s cheating and output ⊥, with all but negligible probability.
Lemma 2.12.2. If ESKE is an authenticated encryption scheme, then if an adversary
A outputs an incorrect W in the query protocol, the client’s response to W will be ⊥,
with all but negligible probability.
Proof. In the protocol for a query p, the client runs ESKE.Dec(KD,W ) to get either
⊥ or a tuple X, which it parses as (ind , lpos , num, len, f1, f2,1, . . . , f2,d). The client
outputs ⊥ if any of the following events occur:
• (Event W.1) ESKE.Dec(KD,W ) = ⊥, or
• (Event W.2) W decrypts successfully, but f1 6= FK1(p[1..len]), or
• (Event W.3) W decrypts successfully and f1 = FK1(p[1..len]), but
ESKE.Dec(f2,i, Tj) 6= ⊥ for some i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, j > len.
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On the other hand, if the adversary cheats, then W is not the ciphertext in the
dictionary entry D(FK1(p[1..i])), where p[1..i] is the longest matching prefix of p,
which means one of the following events:
• (Event W.1′) W is not a ciphertext in D,
• (Event W.2′) W is a ciphertext in D but not for any prefix of p. That is,
W = D(κ) where κ is not equal to FK1(p[1..i]) for any i.
• (Event W.3′) W is a ciphertext in D for a prefix of p, but there is a longer
matching prefix of p. That is, W = D(FK1(p[1..i])) for some i, but there exists
a j > i such that there is an entry D(FK1(p[1..j])).
We want to show that if the adversary cheats, then the client will output ⊥.
If event W.1′ occurs, then we will show below that W.1 occurs with all but negli-
gible probability, by the ciphertext integrity of ESKE.
If event W.2′ occurs, then event W.2 occurs with all but negligible probability
upper bounded by 1/2λ, the probability that FK1(p[1..len]) = f1 when f1 is an inde-
pendent, random value.
If event W.3′ occurs, then clearly W.3 also occurs.
It remains to show that event W.1′ implies event W.1 with all but negligible
probability.
Suppose an adversary A causes event W.1′ but not event W.1. Then the W output
by A is not among the ciphertexts in the dictionary, but ESKE.Dec(KD,W ) 6= ⊥.
Then we can use A to construct an algorithm B that breaks ciphertext integrity of
ESKE. Algorithm B executes EPM honestly, except that in the encryption algorithm,
instead of generating each Wu as ESKE.Enc(KD, Xu), it queries its encryption oracle
on Xu and uses the resulting ciphertext as cj. Then, when A outputs W , B outputs
W in the ciphertext integrity game. Note that A’s view is the same as when it is
interacting with the real scheme EPM. If W is not among the ciphertexts in D, but
ESKE.Dec(KD,W ) 6= ⊥, then B wins the ciphertext integrity game. Therefore, if A
has probability  of causing event W.1′ but not event W.1, B wins the ciphertext
integrity game with the same probability .
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Lemma 2.12.3. If ESKE is an authenticated encryption scheme, then if an adver-
sary A outputs incorrect C1, . . . , Cm in the query protocol, the client’s response to
C1, . . . , Cm will be ⊥, with all but negligible probability.
Proof. In the query protocol, for each i, the client outputs ⊥ if either of the following
events occur:
• (Event C.1) ESKE.Dec(KC, Ci) = ⊥, or
• (Event C.2) ESKE.Dec(KC, Ci) = (p′i, j) where j is not the correct index.
On the other hand, if the adversary cheats and outputs incorrect C1, . . . , Cm, then
for some i, Ci 6= C[xi], which means either of the following events:
• (Event C.1′) Ci is not among C[1], . . . , C[n], or
• (Event C.2′) Ci = C[k] where k 6= xi.
We want to show that if the adversary cheats, then the client will output ⊥.
For any i, if event C.1′ occurs, then we will show below that event C.1 occurs with
all but negligible probability, by the ciphertext integrity of ESKE.
If event C.2′ occurs, then event C.2 occurs, since if Ci = C[k] for some k 6= xi, Ci
will decrypt to (sj, j) for an incorrect index j.
It remains to show that for any i event C.1′ implies event C.1, with all but neg-
ligible probability. Suppose an adversary A causes event C.1′ but not event C.1.
Then Ci is not among C[1], . . . , C[n], but ESKE.Dec(KC, Ci) 6= ⊥. Then we can use
A to construct an algorithm B that breaks ciphertext integrity of ESKE. B executes
EPM honestly, except that in the encryption algorithm, instead of generating each
cj as ESKE.Enc(KC, (sj, j)), it queries its encryption oracle on (sj, j) and uses the
resulting ciphertext as cj. Then, when A outputs C1, . . . , Cm, B chooses a random
i′ R← {1, . . . ,m} and outputs Ci′ in the ciphertext integrity game. Note that A’s view
is the same as when it is interacting with the real scheme EPM. If Ci is not among
C[1], . . . , C[n], but ESKE.Dec(KC, Ci) 6= ⊥, then B wins the ciphertext integrity game
if i′ = i. Therefore, if A has probability  of causing event C.1′ but not event C.1 for
any i, B wins the ciphertext integrity game with probability at least /m.
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Lemma 2.12.4. If ESKE is an authenticated encryption scheme, then if an adver-
sary A outputs incorrect L1, . . . , Lnum in the query protocol, the client’s response to
L1, . . . , Lnum will be ⊥, with all but negligible probability.
The proof is omitted, since it almost identical to the proof of Lemma 2.12.3.
We have shown that if an adversary A cheats when producing any of its outputs
to the client, the client will output ⊥ with all but negligible probability. Therefore,
EPM is correct against malicious adversaries.
2.13 Security
We now prove that our pattern matching encryption scheme satisfies malicious-
(L1,L2)-CQA2 security for certain leakage functions L1 and L2.
2.13.1 Leakage
Before we describe the leakage of our scheme, we define some relevant notions.
We say that a query p visits a node u in the suffix tree Trees for s if ρˆ(u) is a
prefix of p. For any j let pj denote the jth query, and let mj = |pj|. Let nj denote the
number of nodes visited by the query for pj in s, let uj,i denote the ith such node, and
let lenj,i = |ρˆ(uj,i)|. Let numj denote the number of occurrences of pj as a substring
of s. Let ind j denote the index ind in the ciphertext W returned by AnswerQuery
for pj. Note that ind j is the index in s of the longest matching prefix of pj, which is
also the index in s of the longest prefix of pj that is a substring of s. Let lposj denote
the leaf index lpos in the ciphertext W returned by AnswerQuery for pj. If pj is a
substring of s, lposj is equal to the position (between 1 and n, from left to right) of
the leftmost leaf ` for which pj is a prefix of ρˆ(`).
The query prefix pattern for a query pj tells which of the previous
queries p1, . . . , pj−1 visited each of the nodes visited by pj.
Definition 2.13.1 (Query prefix pattern). The query prefix pattern QP(s, p1, . . . , pj)
is a sequence of length nj, where the ith element is a list listi of indices j
′ < j such
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that the j′th query also visited uj,i.
The index intersection pattern for a query pj essentially tells when any of the in-
dices ind j, . . . , ind j + mj − 1 are equal to or overlap with any of the
indices ind i, . . . , ind i +mi − 1 for any previous queries pi.
Definition 2.13.2 (Index intersection pattern). The index intersection pattern
IP(s, p1, . . . , pj) is a sequence of length j, where the ith element is equal to
r1[{ind i, . . . , ind i +mi − 1}] for a fixed random permutation r1 : [n]→ [n].
The leaf intersection pattern for a query pj essentially tells when any of the leaf
positions lposj, . . . , lposj + numj − 1 are equal to or overlap with any of the leaf
positions lpos i, . . . , lpos i + num i − 1 for any previous queries pi.
Definition 2.13.3 (Leaf intersection pattern). The leaf intersection pattern
LP(s, p1, . . . , pj) is a sequence of length j, where the ith element is equal to
r2[{lpos i, . . . , lpos i + numi − 1}] for a fixed random permutation r2 : [n]→ [n].
The leakage of the scheme EPM is as follows. L1(s) is just n = |s|. L2(s, p1, . . . , pj)
consists of
(mj = |pj|, {lenj,i}nji=1, QP(s, p1, . . . , pj), IP(s, p1, . . . , pj), LP(s, p1, . . . , pj)) .
For example, consider the string s “cocoon” (whose suffix tree is shown in Figure 2-
1) and a sequence of three queries, p1 = “co”, p2 = “coco”, and p3 = “cocoa”. Then
the leakage L1(s) is n = 6.
The query for “co” visits node u2, the retrieved indices into s are 1, 2, and the re-
trieved leaf positions are 1, 2. The query for “coco” visits nodes u2 and u3, the indices
retrieved are 1, 2, 3, 4, and the leaf positions retrieved are 1. The query for “cocoa”
visits nodes u2 and u3, the indices retrieved are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and no leaf positions are
retrieved (because there is not a match).
Thus, the leakage L2(s, p1, p2, p3) consists of:
• the lengths 2, 4, 5 of the patterns,
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• the query prefix pattern, which says that p1, p2, p3 visited the same first node,
and then p2 and p3 visited the same second node,
• the index intersection pattern, which says that two of the indices returned for p2
are the same as the two indices returned for p1, and four of the indices returned
for p3 are the same as the four indices returned for p2, and
• the leaf intersection pattern, which says that the leaf returned for p2 is one of
the two leaves returned for p1.
2.13.2 Malicious (L1,L2)-CQA2 Security
Theorem 2.13.4. Let L1 and L2 be defined as in Section 2.13.1. If F is a PRF, P
is a PRP, and ESKE is a CPA-secure, key-private symmetric-key encryption scheme,
then the pattern matching encryption scheme EPM satisfies malicious (L1,L2)-CQA2
security.
Proof. We define a simulator S that works as follows. S first chooses random keys
KD,KC,KL
R← {0, 1}λ.
Ciphertext. Given L1(s) = n, S constructs a simulated ciphertext as follows.
1. Construct a dictionary D as follows. For i = 1, . . . , 2n, choose fresh random val-
ues κi, f2,1, . . . , f2,d,
R← {0, 1}λ, and store Vi = (f2,1, . . . , f2,d,W = ESKE.Enc(KD, 0))
with search key κi in D.
2. Choose an arbitrary element σ0 ∈ Σ. Construct an array C, where C[i] =
ESKE.Enc(KC, (σ0, 0)) for i = 1, . . . , n.
3. Construct an array L, where L[i] = ESKE.Enc(KL, 0) for i = 1, . . . , n.
Output CT = (D,C, L).
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Tables. In order to simulate the query protocol, S will need to do some bookkeep-
ing.
S will maintain two tables T1 and T2, both initially empty. T1 contains all currently
defined tuples (i, j, κ) such that the entry in D with search key κ represents the jth
node visited by the ith query. We write T1(i, j) = κ if (i, j, κ) is an entry in T1.
T2 contains all currently defined tuples (κ, f2, f lag, f lag1, . . . , f lagd), where for
the node u represented by the entry D(κ), κ = f1(u), f2 = f2(u), flag indicates
whether u has been visited by any query, and flagi indicates whether child(u, piu(i))
has been visited. The value of each flag is either “visited” or “unvisited”. We write
T2(κ) = (f2, f lag, f lag1, . . . , f lagd) if (κ, f2, f lag, f lag1, . . . , f lagd) is an entry in T2.
Choose an arbitrary entry (κ∗, V ∗) in D to represent the root node of Trees. In
T2(κ), set all flags to “unvisited” and set f2 = 0. (The f2 for the root node will never
be used, so it is fine to set it to 0.) Define T1(i, 0) = κ∗ for any i.
Query protocols. For the jth token query pj, S is given L2(s, p1, . . . , pj), which
consists ofmj = |pj|, {lenj,i}nji=1, QP(s, p1, . . . , pj), IP(s, p1, . . . , pj), and LP(s, p1, . . . , pj).
For t = 1, . . . , nj, if listt = QP(pj, s)[t] is non-empty (i.e., the node uj,t was visited
by a previous query), let j′ be one of the indices in listt. Let κ = T1(j′, t) and let
(f2, f lag, f lag1, . . . , f lagd) = T2(κ). Tlenj,t = ESKE.Enc(f2, κ). Set T1(j, t) = κ.
If instead listt is empty, choose a random unused entry (κ, V ) in D to represent the
node uj,t, and set T1(j, t) = κ. Let κ′ = T1(j, t−1) and let (f2, f lag, f lag1, . . . , f lagd) =
T2(κ′). Choose a random i ∈ {1, . . . , d} such that flagi is “unvisited”, and set flagi
to “visited”. Let f2,i be D(κ
′).f2,i. Set Tlent = ESKE.Enc(f2,i, κ), set T2(κ).f2 = f2,i,
set T2(κ).f lag to “visited”, and set T2(κ).f lagi to “unvisited” for i = 1, . . . , d.
For any i 6= lent for any t = 1, . . . , nj, choose a random f2 R← {0, 1}λ, and let
Ti = ESKE.Enc(f2, 0).
Send (T1, . . . , Tm) to the adversary.
Upon receiving a W from the adversary, check whether W = D(T1(j, nj)).W . If
not, output ⊥. Otherwise, let (x1, . . . , xm) be a random ordering of the elements of
the set IP(pj, s)[j], and send (x1, . . . , xm) to the adversary.
61
Upon receiving C1, . . . , Cm from the adversary, check whether Ci = C[xi] for each
i. If not, output ⊥. Otherwise, let (y1, . . . , ynum) be a random ordering of the elements
of LP(pj, s)[j], and send (y1, . . . , ynum) to the adversary.
Upon receiving L1, . . . , Lnum from the adversary, check whether Li = L[yi] for
each i. If not, output ⊥.
This concludes the description of the simulator S.
Sequence of games. We now show that the real and ideal experiments are indis-
tinguishable by any PPT adversary A except with negligible probability. To do this,
we consider a sequence of games G0, . . . , G16 that gradually transform the real exper-
iment into the ideal experiment. We will show that each game is indistinguishable
from the previous one, except with negligible probability.
Game G0. This game corresponds to an execution of the real experiment, namely,
• The challenger begins by running Gen(1λ) to generate a key K.
• The adversary A outputs a string s and receives CT ← Enc(K, s) from
the challenger.
• A adaptively chooses patterns p1, . . . , pq. For each pi, A first interacts
with the challenger, who is running IssueQuery(K, pi) honestly. Then A
outputs a description of a function gi, and receives gi(A1, . . . , Ai) from the
challenger, where Ai is the challenger’s private output from the interactive
protocol for pi.
Game G1. This game is the same as G0, except that in G1 the challenger is replaced
by a simulator that does not generate keys K1, K2 and replaces FK1 and FK2
with random functions. Specifically, the simulator maintains tables R1, R2,
initially empty. Whenever the challenger in G0 computes FKi(x) for some x,
the simulator uses Ri(x) if it is defined; otherwise, it chooses a random value
from {0, 1}λ, stores it as Ri(x), and uses that value.
A hybrid argument shows that G1 is indistinguishable from G0 by the PRF
property of F .
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Lemma 2.13.5. If F is a PRF, then G0 and G1 are indistinguishable, except
with negligible probability.
Proof. We consider a hybrid game H1. H1 is the same as G0 except that it uses
R1 in place of FK1 .
Suppose an adversary A can distinguish G0 from H1. Then we can construct an
algorithm B that attacks the PRF property of F with the same advantage. B
acts as A’s challenger in G0, except that whenever there is a call to FK1(x), B
queries its oracle on x. When A outputs a guess bit, B outputs the same guess
bit. If B’s oracle is a function from F , A’s view will be the same as in game
G0, while if it is a random function, A’s view will be the same as in game H1.
Thus, B answers its challenge correctly whenever A does, and breaks the PRF
property of F with the same advantage that A distinguishes games G0 and H1.
A similar argument shows that games H1 and G1 are indistinguishable by the
PRF property of F . Thus, we conclude that G0 and G1 are indistinguishable.
Game G2. This game is the same as G1, except that in G2 the simulator does not
generate keys K3, K4 and replaces PK3 and PK4 with random permutations.
Specifically, the simulator maintains tables R3 and R4, initially empty. When-
ever the simulator in G1 computes PKi(x) for some x, the simulator in G2 uses
Ri(x), if it is defined; otherwise, it chooses a random value in [n] that has not
yet been defined as Ri(y) for any y, and uses that value.
A hybrid argument similar to the one used for G0 and G1 shows that G1 and
G2 are indistinguishable by the PRP property of P .
Lemma 2.13.6. If P is a PRP, then G2 and G1 are indistinguishable, except
with negligible probability.
Proof. We consider a hybrid game H1. Game H1 is the same as G1 except that
it uses R3 in place of PK3 .
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Suppose A can distinguish G0 from H1. Then we can construct an algorithm
B that attacks the PRF property of F with the same advantage. B acts as A’s
challenger in G1, except that whenever there is a call to PK3(x), B queries its
oracle on x. When A outputs a guess bit, B outputs the same guess bit. If B’s
oracle is a function from P , A’s view will be the same as in game G1, while if
it is a random permutation, A’s view will be the same as in game H1. Thus, B
answers its challenge correctly whenever A does, and breaks the PRP property
of P with the same advantage that A distinguishes games G1 and H1.
A similar argument shows that games H1 and G2 are indistinguishable by the
PRP property of P . Thus, we conclude that G1 and G2 are indistinguishable.
Game G3. This is the same as G2, except that we modify the simulator as follows.
For any query, when the simulator receives C1, . . . , Cm from the adversary in
response to indices x1, . . . , xm, the simulator’s decision whether to output ⊥ is
not based on the decryptions of C1, . . . , Cm. Instead, it outputs ⊥ if Ci 6= C[xi]
for any i. Otherwise, the simulator proceeds as in G2.
We argue that games G3 and G2 are indistinguishable by the ciphertext integrity
of ESKE.
Lemma 2.13.7. If ESKE has ciphertext integrity, then G2 and G3 are indistin-
guishable, except with negligible probability.
Proof. We analyze the cases in which G2 and G3 each output ⊥ in response to
C1, . . . , Cm.
For each i, G2 outputs ⊥ if either of the following events occur:
• (Event C.1) ESKE.Dec(KC, Ci) = ⊥, or
• (Event C.2) ESKE.Dec(KC, Ci) = (p′i, j) where j is not the correct index.
For each i, G3 outputs ⊥ if Ci 6= C[xi], which happens if either of the following
events occur:
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• (Event C.1′) Ci is not among C[1], . . . , C[n], or
• (Event C.2′) Ci = C[k] where k 6= xi.
If G3 outputs ⊥ for some i then G2 outputs ⊥ except with negligible probability,
as we already showed by ciphertext integrity of ESKE in Lemma 2.12.3 in the
proof of correctness of EPM against malicious adversaries.
If G2 outputs ⊥, if event C.1 occurred, then C.1′ also occurred, since Ci will
decrypt successfully if it is one of C[1], . . . , C[n]. If event C.2 occurred, then
either C.1′ or C.2′ occurred, since Ci will decrypt to the correct value if Ci =
C[xi]. Therefore, if G2 outputs ⊥ for some i, so does G3.
Thus, G2 and G3 are indistinguishable except with negligible probability.
Game G4. This game is the same as G3, except for the following differences. The
simulator does not decrypt the C1, . . . , Cm from the adversary. For any query p,
instead of deciding whether to output ∅ based on the decryptions of C1, . . . , Cm,
the simulator outputs ∅ if p is not a substring of s. Otherwise, the simulator
proceeds as in G3.
As we showed in Lemmas 2.12.2 and 2.12.3, if the adversary does not send
the correct W , the client will respond with ⊥, and if the adversary does not
send the correct C1, . . . , Cm, the client will also respond with ⊥. Therefore,
if the simulator has not yet output ⊥ when it is deciding whether to output
∅, then C1, . . . , Cm are necessarily the correct ciphertexts, and the decryptions
p′1, . . . , p
′
m computed in G3 match p if and only if p is a substring of s. Therefore,
G3 and G4 are indistinguishable.
Game G5 . This game is the same as G4, except that in G5, for i = 1, . . . , n, instead
of setting ci = ESKE.Enc(KC, (si, i)), the simulator sets ci = ESKE.Enc(KC, (σ0, 0)),
where σ0 is an arbitrary element of Σ.
Note that in both G4 and G5, KC is hidden and the ci’s are never decrypted.
A hybrid argument shows that games G4 and G5 are indistinguishable by CPA
security of ESKE.
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Lemma 2.13.8. If ESKE is a CPA-secure encryption scheme, then G4 and G5
are indistinguishable, except with negligible probability.
Proof. We show this via a series of n + 1 hybrid games H0, . . . , Hn. Let σ0
be an arbitrary element of Σ. In Hi, during the encryption phase, for i
′ ≤ i,
the simulator computes ci′ as ESKE.Enc(KC, (σ0, 0)). For i′ > i, it computes ci′
as ESKE.Enc(KC, (si′ , i′)). The rest of the game proceeds as in G4. Note that
H0 = G4 and Hn = G5.
If there is an adversaryA that can distinguish Hi−1 from Hi for any i ∈ {1 . . . n},
then we can construct an algorithm B that attacks the CPA security of ESKE
with the same advantage.
B acts as the simulator in Hi−1, with the following exceptions. During the
encryption phase, for i′ < i, B generates ci′ by querying the encryption oracle
on (σ0, 0), and for i
′ > i, B generates ci′ by querying the encryption oracle
on (si′ , i
′). B outputs (si, i), (σ0, 0) as its challenge, and uses the challenge
ciphertext as ci.
Now, if B’s challenger returns an encryption of (si, i), then A’s view will be
the same as in Hi−1, while if the challenger returns an encryption of (σ0, 0),
then A’s view will be the same as in Hi. Thus, B answers its challenge correctly
whenever A does, and breaks the CPA security of ESKE with the same advantage
that A distinguishes games Hi−1 and Hi.
Since there are a polynomial number of games H0, . . . , Hn, we conclude that
H0 = G4 and Hn = G5 are indistinguishable.
Game G6. This game is the same as G5, except that we eliminate the use of the ran-
dom permutation R3, in the following way. For i = 1, . . . , n, the simulator set
C[i] = ci instead of C[R3(i)] = ci, where ci = ESKE.Enc(KC, (σ0, 0)). Further-
more, for any query pj, the simulator is given an additional input IP(s, p1, . . . , pj)
(as defined in Section 2.13.1). To generate (x1, . . . , xm) in the query protocol,
the simulator outputs a random ordering of the elements in IP(s, p1, . . . , pj)[j].
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Since each ci is an encryption under KC of (σ0, 0), it does not matter whether
the ci’s are permuted in C; if we permute the ci’s or not, the result is indistin-
guishable. After we eliminate the use of R3 in generating C, R3 is only used by
the simulator to compute (x1, . . . , xm). Thus, we can replace the computation
of (x1, . . . , xm) for each query pj with a random ordering of the elements of
IP(s, p1, . . . , pj)[j], and the result will be indistinguishable.
Game G7. This is the same as G6, except that we modify the simulator as follows.
For any query, when the simulator receives L1, . . . , Lnum from the adversary in
response to indices y1, . . . , ynum , the simulator’s decision whether to output ⊥
is not based on the decryptions of the L1, . . . , Lnum ; instead, it outputs ⊥ if
Li 6= L[yi] for any i; otherwise, it proceeds to compute the answer A as in G6.
A hybrid argument shows that games G6 and G7 are indistinguishable by the
ciphertext integrity of ESKE.
Lemma 2.13.9. If ESKE has ciphertext integrity, then G6 and G7 are indistin-
guishable, except with negligible probability.
The proof is omitted since it is nearly identical to the proof for G2 and G3.
Game G8. This game is the same as G7, except for the following differences. The
simulator does not decrypt the L1, . . . , Lnum from the adversary. For any query
pj, instead of computing the answer Aj using the decryptions of L1, . . . , Lnum ,
if Aj has not already been set to ⊥ or ∅, the simulator sets Aj = F(s, pj).
As we showed in Lemmas 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.12.4, if any of the W , C1, . . . , Cm
or L1, . . . , Lnum from the adversary are incorrect, the client will respond to
the incorrect message with ⊥. Therefore, if the simulator has not yet output
⊥ when it is computing Aj, then the adversary has executed AnswerQuery
honestly, and Aj = F(s, pj) (by correctness of EPM). Therefore, G7 and G8 are
indistinguishable.
Game G9. This game is the same as G8, except that in G9, for each i = 1, . . . , n, the
simulator generates each `i as ESKE.Enc(KL, 0) instead of ESKE.Enc(KL, (ind leaf i , i)).
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A hybrid argument shows that G8 and G9 are indistinguishable by the CPA
security of ESKE.
Lemma 2.13.10. If ESKE is a CPA-secure encryption scheme, then G8 and G9
are indistinguishable, except with negligible probability.
The proof is omitted since it is nearly identical to the proof for G4 and G5.
Game G10. This game is the same as G9, except that we eliminate the use of the
random permutation R4, in the following way. For i = 1, . . . , n, the simulator
set L[i] = `i instead of L[R4(i)] = `i, where `i = ESKE.Enc(KL, 0). Furthermore,
for any query pj, the simulator is given an additional input LP(s, p1, . . . , pj) (as
defined in Section 2.13.1). To generate (y1, . . . , ynum) in the query protocol, the
simulator outputs a random ordering of the elements in LP(s, p1, . . . , pj)[j].
The argument for game G10 is analogous to the one for game G6. Since each `i is
an encryption under KL of 0, it does not matter whether the `i’s are permuted
in L; if we permute the `i’s or not, the result is indistinguishable. After we
eliminate the use of R4 in generating L, R4 is only used by the simulator to
compute (y1, . . . , ynum). Thus, we can replace the computation of (y1, . . . , ynum)
for each query pj with a random ordering of the elements of LP(s, p1, . . . , pj)[j],
and the result will be indistinguishable.
Game G11. This is the same as G10, except that we modify the simulator as follows.
For any query, when the simulator receives a W from the adversary in response
to T1, . . . , Tm, the simulator’s decision whether to output ⊥ will not based on
the decryption of W . Instead, it will output ⊥ if W is not the ciphertext in the
dictionary entry D(R1(p[1..i])), where p[1..i] is the longest matching prefix of
p. Otherwise, the simulator proceeds as in G10.
We argue that games G10 and G11 are indistinguishable by the ciphertext in-
tegrity of ESKE.
Lemma 2.13.11. If ESKE has ciphertext integrity, then G10 and G11 are indis-
tinguishable, except with negligible probability.
68
Proof. We analyze the cases in which G10 and G11 each output ⊥ in response
to a W .
G10 runs ESKE.Dec(KD,W ) to get either ⊥ or a tuple X, which it parses as
(ind , lpos , num, len, f1, f2,1, . . . , f2,d). G10 outputs ⊥ if any of the following
events occur:
• (Event L.1) ESKE.Dec(KD,W ) = ⊥, or
• (Event L.2) W decrypts successfully, but f1 6= R1(p[1..len]), or
• (Event L.3) W decrypts successfully and f1 = R1(p[1..len]), but
ESKE.Dec(f2,i, Tj) 6= ⊥ for some i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, j > len.
G11 outputs ⊥ if W is not the ciphertext in the dictionary entry D(R1(p[1..i])),
where p[1..i] is the longest matching prefix of p, which is the case if any of the
following events occur:
• (Event L.1′) W is not a ciphertext in D,
• (Event L.2′) W is a ciphertext in D but not for any prefix of p. That is,
W = D(κ) where κ is not equal to R1(p[1..i]) for any i.
• (Event L.3′) W is a ciphertext in D for a prefix of p, but there is a longer
matching prefix of p. That is, W = D(R1(p[1..i])) for some i, but there
exists a j > i such that there is an entry D(R1(p[1..j])).
If G11 outputs ⊥ in response to W for any query, then G10 also outputs ⊥
except with negligible probability, as we already showed by ciphertext integrity
of ESKE in Lemma 2.12.2 in the proof of correctness of EPM against malicious
adversaries.
If G10 outputs ⊥, then G11 also outputs ⊥, since if W is the ciphertext in
D(R1(p[1..i])), then W will decrypt successfully, with f1 = R1(p[1..len]), and
ESKE.Dec(f2,k, Tj) = ⊥ for all k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, j > i.
Thus, G10 and G11 are indistinguishable except with negligible probability.
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Game G12. This is the same as G11, except that the simulator in G12 does not
decrypt the W from the adversary in the query protocol.
Since the simulator in G11 no longer uses any values from the decryption of W ,
G12 is indistinguishable from G11.
Game G13. This is the same as G12, except that in G13, for each node u the simulator
generates Wu as ESKE.Enc(KD, 0) instead of ESKE.Enc(KD, Xu).
A hybrid argument shows that G12 and G13 are indistinguishable by the CPA
security of ESKE.
Lemma 2.13.12. If ESKE is a CPA-secure encryption scheme, then G12 and
G13 are indistinguishable, except with negligible probability.
The proof is omitted since it is nearly identical to the proof for G4 and G5.
Game G14. This is the same as game G13, except that in the query protocol, for
any non-matching prefix p[1..i], the simulator replaces Ti with an encryption
under a fresh random key. That is, for any query p, for any prefix p[1..i],
i = 1, . . . ,m, if p[1..i] is a non-matching prefix, the simulator chooses a fresh
random value r and sets Ti ← ESKE.Enc(r, R1(p[1..i])); otherwise, it sets Ti ←
ESKE.Enc(R2(p[1..i]), R1(p[1..i])) as in game G13.
For any k and i, let pk denote the kth query, and let Tk,i denote the Ti produced
by the simulator for the kth query. The only way an adversary A may be able
to tell apart G13 and G14 is if two queries share a non-matching prefix; that is,
there exist i, j, j′ such that j 6= j′ and pj[1..i] = pj′ [1..i]. In this case, G14 will
use different encryption keys to generate Ti,j and Ti,j′ , while G13 will use the
same key. Note that the decryption keys for Ti,j and Ti,j′ will never be revealed
to A in either game. Thus, a hybrid argument shows that G13 and G14 are
indistinguishable by the which-key-concealing property of ESKE.
Lemma 2.13.13. If ESKE is a which-key-concealing encryption scheme, then
games G13 and G14 are indistinguishable, except with negligible probability.
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Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that can distinguish G13 and G14.
Let qmax be an upper bound on the number of queries A chooses, and let mmax
be an upper bound on the length of A’s queries, where qmax and mmax are
polynomial in λ.
Consider the following sequence of qmax(mmax + 1) hybrid games. For each
i ∈ {0, . . . ,mmax}, j ∈ {1, . . . , qmax}, game Hi,j is the same as G13, with the
following exceptions.
• For j′ < j, for each i′, if pj′ [1..i′] is non-matching, choose a fresh random
value r and set Tj′,i′ ← ESKE.Enc(r, R1(pj′ [1..i])), as in game G14.
• For the jth query pj, for i′ ≤ i, if pj[1..i′] is non-matching, again choose a
fresh random value r and set Tj,i′ ← ESKE.Enc(r, R1(pj[1..i′])), as in game
G14.
Note that H0,1 = G13 and Hmmax,qmax = G14.
Now, we argue that if there is an adversary A that can distinguish Hi−1,j from
Hi,j for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,mmax}, j ∈ {1, . . . , qmax}, then we can construct an
algorithm B that attacks the which-key-concealing property of ESKE with the
same advantage.
B will act as the simulator in Hi−1,j, with the following exception. If pj[1..i] is
non-matching, B first queries its left encryption oracle on R1(pj[1..i]) and sets
Tj,i to the resulting ciphertext. B then remembers pj[1..i], and for any later
queries pj′ that share the prefix pj[1..i], B queries its right oracle on R1(pj[1..i])
and uses the resulting ciphertext as Tj′,i. Otherwise, B proceeds as in Hi−1,j.
Now, if both of B’s encryption oracles are for the same key, then Tj,i and the
Tj′,i for all future queries p
′
j that share the prefix pj[1..i] will be encrypted under
the same random key, and A’s view will be the same as in Hi−1,j. On the other
hand, if the two encryption oracles are for different keys, then Tj,i will have
been generated using a different random key from that used to generate Tj′,i
for all future queries pj′ that share the prefix pj[1..i], and A’s view will be the
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same as in Hi,j.
Note that if pj[1..i] is a matching prefix, so B does not output a challenge, then
Hi−1,j and Hi,j are identical, so A’s view is the same as in both Hi−1,j and Hi,j.
Thus, Hi−1,j and Hi,j are indistinguishable by the key hiding property of ESKE.
We can show by a very similar reduction that games Hmmax,j and H1,j+1 are
indistinguishable. Since there are a polynomial number of hybrid games, we
conclude then that games H0,1 = G13 and Hmmax,qmax = G14 are indistinguish-
able.
Game G15. This is the same as game G14, except that in the query protocol for any
pattern p, for any non-matching prefix p[1..i], the simulator replaces Ti with an
encryption of 0. That is, for any query p, for any prefix p[1..i], i = 1, . . . ,m, if
p[1..i] is non-matching, the simulator chooses a fresh random value r and sets
Ti ← ESKE.Enc(r, 0); otherwise, it sets Ti ← ESKE.Enc(r, R1(p[1..i])) as in game
G14.
The only way an adversary A may be able to tell apart G14 and G15 is if a
prefix pj[1..i] is non-matching. In this case, in G14, Tj,i will be an encryption of
0, while in G15, Tj,i will be an encryption of R1(pj[1..i]). The decryption key for
Tj,i will never be revealed to A in either game. Thus, a hybrid argument shows
that games G14 and G15 are indistinguishable by the CPA security of ESKE.
Lemma 2.13.14. If ESKE is a CPA-secure encryption scheme, then games G14
and G15 are indistinguishable, except with negligible probability.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that can distinguish G14 and G15.
Let qmax be an upper bound on the number of queries that A chooses, and let
mmax be an upper bound on the length of A’s queries, where qmax and mmax
are polynomial in λ.
We consider a sequence of qmax(mmax + 1) hybrid games. For each
i ∈ {0, . . . ,mmax}, j ∈ {1, . . . , qmax}, game Hi,j is the same as G14, with the
following exceptions.
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• For j′ < j, for each i′, if pj′ [1..i′] is non-matching, choose a fresh random
value r and set Tj′,i′ ← ESKE.Enc(r, 0), as in game G15.
• For the jth query pj, for i′ ≤ i, if pj[1..i′] is non-matching, again choose a
fresh random value r and set Tj,i ← ESKE.Enc(r, 0) as in game G15.
Note that H0,1 = G14 and Hmmax,qmax = G15.
Now, we argue that if there is an adversary A that can distinguish Hi−1,j from
Hi,j for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,mmax}, j ∈ {1, . . . , qmax}, then we can construct an
algorithm B that attacks the CPA security of ESKE with the same advantage.
B acts as the simulator in Hi−1,j, with the following exception. If pj[1..i] is non-
matching, it chooses a fresh random value r and outputs r, 0 as its challenge in
the CPA-security game, and sets Ti,j to be the resulting ciphertext. Otherwise,
B proceeds as in Hi−1,j. Note that in both Hi−1,j and Hi,j, the random key r is
used to encrypt only one ciphertext.
Now, if the CPA-security challenger gave B an encryption of r, then A’s view
will be the same as in Hi−1,j. On the other hand if the CPA-security challenger
returned an encryption of 0, then A’s view will be the same as in Hi,j.
Note that if pj[1..i] is a matching prefix, so B does not produce a challenge,
then Hi−1,j and Hi,j are identical, so A’s view is the same as in both Hi−1,j and
Hi,j. Thus, Hi−1,j and Hi,j are indistinguishable by the CPA security of ESKE.
We can show by a very similar reduction that games Hmmax,j and H1,j+1 are
indistinguishable. Since there are a polynomial number of hybrid games, we
conclude then that games H0,1 = G14 and Hmmax,qmax = G15 are indistinguish-
able.
Game G16. This is the final game, which corresponds to an execution of the ideal
experiment. In G16, the simulator is replaced with the simulator S defined
above.
The differences between G15 and G16 are as follows. In G16, the simulator no
longer uses the string s when creating the dictionary D, and for each query p, it
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no longer uses p when creating T1, . . . , Tm. When constructing D, whenever the
simulator in G15 generates a value by applying a random function to a string,
S generates a fresh random value without using the string. Note that all of the
ρˆ(u) strings used in D are unique, so S does not need to ensure consistency
between any of the random values. Then, for any query pj, for each matching
prefix pj[1..i], S constructs Ti to be consistent with D and with prefix queries
using the query prefix pattern QP(s, p1, . . . , pj). While the simulator in G15
associates entries in D to strings when it first constructs D, S associates entries
in D to strings as it answers each new query. However, both simulators produce
identical views.
2.14 Conclusion
We presented a definition of queryable encryption schemes and defined security against
both honest-but-curious and malicious adversaries making chosen query attacks. Our
security definitions are parameterized by leakage functions that specify the informa-
tion that is revealed about the message and the queries by the ciphertext and the
query protocols.
We constructed an efficient pattern matching scheme – a queryable encryption
scheme that supports finding all occurrences of a pattern p in an encrypted string s.
Our approach is based on suffix trees. Our construction uses only basic symmetric-key
primitives (pseudorandom functions and permutations and an authenticated, which-
key-concealing encryption scheme). The ciphertext size and encryption time are
O(λn) and query time and message size are O(λm + k), where λ is the security
parameter, n is the length of the string, m is the length of the pattern, and k is the
number of occurrences of the pattern. Querying requires only 3 rounds of communi-
cation.
While we have given a formal characterization of the leakage of our pattern match-
ing scheme, it is an open problem to analyze the practical cost of the leakage. Given
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the leakage from several “typical” queries, what can a server infer about the mes-
sage and the queries? For some applications, the efficiency may be worth the leakage
tradeoff, especially in applications where current practice does not use encryption at
all.
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Chapter 3
Strategic Range Voting and
Approval Voting
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study two voting systems: range voting and approval voting.
In range voting, studied in detail by Smith [53], the voter gives each alternative
a score in some fixed range (e.g., between 0 and 1). In approval voting, studied
in detail by Brams and Fishburn [13], the voter “approves” or “disapproves” each
alternative. That is, the voter gives each alternative a score of either 0 or 1. Range
voting allows several (or infinitely many) possible scores, while approval voting allows
only two scores; thus, approval voting can be thought of as a special case of range
voting. Range voting provides added expressiveness over approval voting. Thus, it is
natural to ask when and whether this added expressiveness is beneficial to a rational
(strategic) voter. That is, when would a strategic range voter, with some model
of information about the other votes, want to give some alternatives intermediate
scores, and when would she want to give each alternative either the maximum or the
minimum score (voting “approval-style”)? This question was studied previously by
Warren Smith and others (see Smith’s summary [51]). In this chapter, we study this
question more formally and generally.
We first review related results on strategic voting in some simple models of voter
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information. We then show, for a more general model of information, that in the limit
as the number of voters grows large, a rational range voter, maximizing her expected
utility, will want to vote approval-style. Thus, in some sense, in most cases the added
expressiveness of range voting is not beneficial to a rational voter, and in fact a voter
using the intermediate scores in the range is not voting in her best interest.
Next, we propose a more concrete class of functions, beta distributions, as a
reasonable and interesting model for voter information. A beta distribution can
be used to model a posterior probability distribution on the average score for each
alternative after seeing a given number of approvals and disapprovals from pre-election
polls, given a uniform prior.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we review notation
and definitions. In Section 3.3 we describe some related known results about strate-
gic range and approval voting. In Section 3.4 we present our general model for voter
information; in Section 3.5 we describe optimal range voting in this model, showing
that it can be achieved by approval-style voting. Section 3.6 describes beta distribu-
tions as a way to model information about other votes. Sections 3.7 gives conclusions
and open problems.
3.2 Preliminaries
Ballots, profiles, and alternatives. We consider an election which uses a profile
P = (B1, . . . , Bn) containing n ballots (a.k.a. votes) to determine a winner from a set
A = {A1, . . . , Am} of m alternatives.
Range voting and approval voting. For both range voting and approval voting,
a ballot Bi is a vector of m numbers (called “scores”):
Bi = (Bi,1, Bi,2, . . . , Bi,m) .
Each component Bi,j is the level of support the ballot Bi expresses for alternative Aj;
larger numbers indicate greater support.
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In range voting, each score Bi,j is a number in the range from some bmin up to some
bmax. The scores may be allowed to be any real number in the interval [bmin, bmax], or
they may be restricted to integers in that range, depending on the version of range
voting that is used. We will let the scores be any real number in [bmin, bmax]. Without
loss of generality, we let bmin = 0 and bmax = 1.
In approval voting, each score Bi,j is either 0 or 1. A ballot Bi indicates approval
of those alternatives Aj for which Bi,j = 1 and disapproval of those alternatives Aj
for which Bi,j = 0. Approval voting can be thought of as a special case of range
voting with only two allowed scores.
For both range and approval voting, a winning alternative is one with maximum
total score, summed over the votes cast. That is, for j = 1, . . . ,m, let Xj = Σ
n
i=1Bi,j.
Then the winner is one of the alternatives Aj for which Xj = max{X1, . . . , Xm}. We
assume ties are broken uniformly at random (although other tie-breaking rules could
be used).
Clearly, a voter can ignore the additional expressive freedom allowed by range
voting, and give each alternative a score of either 0 or 1, effectively reducing the
range voting ballot to just an approval voting ballot, i.e., voting “approval-style”.
(For range voting, we will sometimes use “approve” to mean “give the maximum
score (1) to” and “disapprove” to mean “give the minimum score (0) to”.)
Our main question here is: in a range voting election, when would a voter want
to vote approval-style?
Other n− 1 voters. We will consider a single voter Alice who is determining how
best to vote. For notational purposes, we will assume Alice is the last of the n
voters and casts ballot Bn. Let X
′
j = Σ
n−1
i=1 Bi,j denote the sum of the scores given to
alternative Aj by the other n− 1 voters.
The actual order in which the voters cast their ballots is unimportant. We just
need that the other votes do not depend on Alice’s vote. Although we say Alice is
the last voter, Alice does not see the previous votes, and instead she has only some
partial information or beliefs (the modeling of which we will discuss later) about the
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other votes.
Utilities. We make use of utility functions, as developed in the utility theory of
von Neumann and Morgenstern [58]. We assume that Alice has a utility ui for the
outcome that Ai is the winner, for each i. Let u = (u1, u2, . . . , um). Alice prefers
alternative Aj to alternative Ak if uj > uk. In game-theoretic terms, uij is the payoff
to voter i if alternative Aj wins.
We assume that Alice’s utilities are a function of only the selected winner; no
utility is derived from other factors such as the actual number of votes any alternative
receives, the act of voting “sincerely”, etc.
We assume that Alice is rational, meaning that she votes in a way that maximizes
her expected utility (over Alice’s uncertainty about the other votes and any random-
ness used to break ties) of the alternative selected as the winner of the election. We
call a ballot optimal for Alice if it maximizes her expected utility of the winner of the
election.
We only consider the utilities of a single voter, Alice, so we do not have any issues
that may arise with interpersonal comparison of utility.
Three or more alternatives. We assume there are three or more alternatives
(m > 3). Otherwise, the optimal voting strategy is trivial, regardless of what infor-
mation is known about the other votes. If there is only one alternative, all ballots
are optimal. If there are only two alternatives A1 and A2, if u1 = u2 (i.e., Alice is
indifferent between A1 and A2), then all ballots are optimal. Otherwise (if there are
only two alternatives A1 and A2 and u1 6= u2), without loss of generality suppose
u1 > u2. Then, a ballot that gives the maximum score 1 to A1 and the minimum
score 0 to A2 is optimal.
Sincerity. In addition to the question of whether a rational range voter’s best
strategy can be achieved by approval-style voting, we are also interested in whether
the best strategy is sincere. We say that a range voting ballot b = (b1, . . . , bm) is
sincere if, for any two alternatives Ai and Aj, if ui ≥ uj, then bi ≥ bj.
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Brams and Fishburn [13] first noted that for approval voting, when there are only
m = 3 alternatives, a voter’s optimal strategy can always be achieved by a sincere
ballot, since it can only help the voter to approve her most preferred candidate and
disapprove her least preferred candidate. The same argument applies to range voting
– an optimal strategy can always include a score of 1 for the most preferred candidate
and a score of 0 for the least preferred candidate.
3.3 Strategic Range Voting: Known Results
Complete information. First, we observe that if Alice has complete information
and knows the totals X ′i from the other voters exactly, then it is simple to determine
an optimal strategy for Alice – essentially, give the maximum score 1 to her most
preferred alternative that can be made to win, and give the minimum score 0 to every
other alternative.
That is, if the winner is already determined by the other votes, i.e., the difference
between the highest and second highest totals among X ′1, . . . , X
′
m is greater than 1,
then Alice’s vote cannot change the outcome, and all possible ballots are optimal.
Otherwise, for each j = 1, . . . ,m, let bj be the ballot that gives a score of 1 to
alternative Aj and 0 to every other alternative. Alice computes her expected utility
for the election winner if she casts ballot bj, for each j, and casts the one (or any of the
ones) that maximizes her expected utility. (The only reason this is an expected utility
is because there may be a tie for winner that will be broken randomly; otherwise,
Alice’s utility is known, since we are in a “complete information” scenario.)
If there are no alternatives Aj that have a score X
′
j that is exactly 1 less than the
maximum of X ′1, . . . , X
′
m, then the strategy given above is just to give a score of 1 to
her most preferred alternative among the ones whose score from the other voters is
within 1 of the leader.
The approval-style strategy given above may be one among an infinite number of
optimal strategies, since the range of allowable scores is continuous.
Example 3.3.1. As an example, suppose there are 4 alternatives A1, . . . , A4, 10
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voters, and the scores from the first 9 voters are X ′1 = 4.0, X
′
2 = 6.2, X
′
3 = 5.7, and
X ′4 = 5.1. Let Alice’s utilities be u1 = 30, u2 = 15, u3 = 18, and u4 = 25.
Then an optimal strategy for Alice is to assign a score of 1 to A3 and 0 to every
other alternative, since A2 and A3 are the only alternatives that can win, and Alice
prefers A2 to A3.
Modifying the above example slightly, we get an example involving ties.
Example 3.3.2. Suppose Alice’s utilities are again u1 = 30, u2 = 15, u3 = 18, and
u4 = 25, but the scores from the other voters are X
′
1 = 4.0, X
′
2 = 6.2, X
′
3 = 5.7, and
X ′4 = 5.2.
Then it is now optimal for Alice to assign a score of 1 to A4 and 0 to every other
alternative, since doing so creates a tie for the winner between A2 and A4, so Alice
achieves an expected utility of (u2 + u4)/2 = (15 + 25)/2 = 20. Giving the max score
to A3 instead would make A3 the outright winner and Alice would achieve a utility
of 18.
Zero information. At the opposite extreme of full information, we can consider
the case where Alice has “zero” information about the other votes. More precisely,
Alice assumes that every other voter gives every alternative a score that is uniformly
random in [0, 1]. (Note that this is only one among many possible ways to define
“zero” information; we don’t claim that this is the only reasonable way to model a
voter having no information.)
Warren Smith [52] gives an analysis of strategic range voting in the zero-information
scenario. Smith assumes that the number of voters n is large and that the probabil-
ity of a pairwise “near tie” for winner between any two candidates Ai and Aj being
broken in favor of Ai by Alice’s ballot Bn is proportional to max(Bn,i −Bn,j, 0).
In more detail, a “near tie” is defined as follows:
Definition 3.3.3. We say there is a near tie between Ai and Aj if, based on the total
scores from the other voters, either Ai or Aj can be the winner with the addition of
Alice’s vote (depending on how she votes), and no other candidate can win.
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So, Ai and Aj are in a near tie for winner if |X ′i−X ′j| ≤ 1 and X ′k+1 < min(X ′i, X ′j)
for all k 6= i, j. The probability that the winner if Alice were to abstain (or cast a
ballot of all zeros) is Aj and the winner with the addition of Alice’s ballot is Ai
is assumed to be proportional to the score difference Bn,i − Bn,j (if Bn,i > Bn,j; 0
otherwise). Roughly, this property can be interpreted as saying that, when the totals
X ′i and X
′
j are within 1 of each other, the distribution of the difference X
′
i − X ′j is
uniform.
The “proportionality property” described above is assumed to be a consequence
of the number of voters being large. However, why the proportionality assumption
should follow from the number of voters being large is not discussed, although it
may seem true intuitively. In our general model in Section 3.4, we will prove this
consequence formally.
The final assumption of Smith is that the probabilities of ties for winner between
three or more candidates are small enough that they can be ignored.
In the zero information model, since the scores for each alternative are completely
random, every pair of distinct alternatives Ai and Aj is equally like to be in a pair-
wise near tie for winner. Smith [52] proves that when all pairwise ties are equally
likely, under the assumptions given above, a range voter’s optimal strategy is to vote
approval-style using a method known as mean-based thresholding : give the maximum
score 1 to every alternative Ai for which ui is at least the average of the utilities for all
the alternatives, and give the minimum score 0 to every other alternative. Brams and
Fishburn [13] originally proved optimality of mean-based thresholding in an analogous
model for approval voting. Note that mean-based thresholding is a sincere strategy;
if a voter approves of Ai then she will also approve of any alternative Aj for which
uj > ui.
To illustrate mean-based thresholding for range voting, let us look at an example.
Example 3.3.4. Suppose Alice’s utilities are again u1 = 30, u2 = 15, u3 = 18, and
u4 = 25. Then the average utility is (30+15+18+25)/4 = 22, so Alice’s mean-based
thresholding strategy is to give a score of 1 to A1 and A4 and give a score of 0 to A2
and A3.
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Below we give an adaptation of Smith’s proof [52] of the optimality of mean-based
thresholding.
Theorem 3.3.5. Suppose all pairwise near ties are equally likely, ties between three
or more alternatives can be ignored, and the probability of Alice’s ballot Bn breaking a
pairwise near tie (as defined in Definition 3.3.3) between any two alternatives Ai and
Aj in favor of Ai is proportional to max(Bn,i−Bn,j, 0). Then mean-based thresholding
is an optimal range voting strategy for Alice.
Proof. For any i and j, let pij denote the probability of a near tie for winner between
Ai and Aj.
For any given alternative Ai, suppose we fix the scores on Alice’s ballot for all the
other alternatives Aj, j 6= i. Then, for Ai, suppose Alice starts with a score of 0 and
then considers increasing her score for Ai by some amount q. The resulting change
∆ in Alice’s expected utility is proportional to
Σj 6=ipij · q · (ui − uj),
since Alice gains ui and loses uj if the increase in Ai’s score causes Ai to win when
Aj was the winner otherwise.
The near-tie probability pij is the same for all pairs i, j, so ∆ is proportional to
qΣj 6=i(ui − uj). Thus, if Σj 6=i(ui − uj) ≥ 0, we want to set q = 1 (i.e., give Ai a score
of 1), and otherwise we want q = 0 (i.e., give Ai a score of 0.
Simplifying, we get:
Σj 6=i(ui − uj) ≥ 0
(n− 1)ui > Σj 6=iuj
nui > Σjuj
ui > (Σjuj)/n .
Thus, Alice should approve of all alternatives with utility at least equal to her
average utility for the alternatives, and disapprove of all other alternatives.
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Smith [52] also studies several other voting strategies in the zero-information
model empirically, using computer simulations, for various numbers of voters.
Laslier’s Leader Rule Before presenting our model, we describe related work of
Laslier [40] on strategic approval voting. Laslier analyzes how a rational voter should
vote when the number of other voters is large, in the following model. It is assumed
that Alice knows exactly how many of the other voters (theoretically) approve each
alternative (from pre-election polls, for example), but the actual number of votes each
alternative gets in the election will be perturbed somewhat by a “trembling ballot”
model. In the trembling ballot model, for each voter and for each alternative, there
is a small, fixed probability  > 0 that the voter’s vote for that alternative will not
be recorded (equivalently, that the vote will be recorded as a 0 (disapproval) for that
alternative). These “recording mistakes” happen independently for each combination
of voter and alternative, regardless of how the voter votes for other alternatives.
Furthermore, it is assumed that Alice believes that ties between three or more
candidates can be ignored. Note that this is a behavioral assumption, not a math-
ematical conclusion from the model; in fact, as Laslier mentions, it is not the case
that three-way ties become negligible in the trembling ballot model as the number of
voters grows large. However, it is reasonable for voters to believe that three-way ties
can be ignored and to vote accordingly.
In the trembling ballot model, Laslier proves that a voter’s optimal strategy is
given by what is known as the “leader rule”: Let A1 be the alternative with the
highest announced score (from pre-election polls), and let A2 be the alternative with
the second highest announced score. Then the leader rule says to approve of every
alternative Aj that the voter prefers to A1 (uj > u1), and approve of A1 if the voter
prefers it to A2 (u1 > u2).
The leader rule is simple to understand, and it is also a sincere strategy. However,
the trembling ballot model is somewhat restrictive, as the voter is assumed to have
exact information about the other votes; the only uncertainty in the election comes
from the recording mistakes that occur with small probability. Furthermore, the
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voter ignores three-way ties, even though mathematically they cannot necessarily be
ignored.
3.4 Our Model
We now present a general way to model a voter’s information about the other votes.
We will prove formally that under general conditions, a range voter should vote
approval-style, as the number of voters grows large.
3.4.1 Notation
We first define some notation that will be useful for our analysis. For any ballot Bi =
(Bi,1, . . . , Bi,m), let Bi,j = Bi,j/n for each j be “normalized scores”, and let Bi =
(Bi,1, . . . , Bi,m) be the corresponding “normalized ballot”.
Let Xj = Xj/n = Σ
n
i=1Bi,j be the average of the scores given to alternative Aj,
or the sum of the normalized scores given to alternative Aj. Note that for approval
voting, Xj is the fraction of voters that approve Aj.
In our analysis we will work with the normalized ballots Bi instead of the original
ballots Bi. Clearly, determining the winner using the normalized ballots Bi and the
average scores Xj is equivalent to using the original ballots Bi and total scores Xj.
A winning alternative Aj is one for which Xj = max{X1, . . . , Xm}.
Let X ′j = Σ
n−1
i=1 Bi,j denote the sum of the normalized scores given to alternative
Aj by the other n − 1 voters. (Note that X ′j is not the same as the average of the
scores given to Aj by the other n − 1 voters, since the scores are divided by n, not
n− 1.)
3.4.2 Modeling Information about Other Votes
We model Alice’s information about the other votes in a general way. Alice assumes
that the sums of the normalized scores from the other n− 1 voters, X ′1, . . . , X ′m, are
independent, and that each X ′i is distributed according to a given probability density
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function (PDF) fi and cumulative probability distribution function (CDF) Fi.
For i = 1, . . . ,m, let fi(x) be the PDF for X ′i, and let Fi(x) be the CDF for X
′
i:
Fi(x) = Pr{X ′i ≤ x} (3.1)
fi(x) =
dFi(x)
dx
(3.2)
Fi(x) =
∫ x
0
fi(y) dy (3.3)
We assume that fi and Fi are well-defined over the entire interval [0, 1]. We do not
make any other restrictions on fi or Fi. Thus, our model is quite general.
Note that Alice’s information about the other votes may not necessarily be accu-
rate; this is fine for our purposes. Alice’s information reflects her expectations about
how the other voters will vote, and these are the expectations that Alice will use to
determine an optimal ballot to cast. We are interested in how to determine such an
optimal ballot, and when optimal range voting can or cannot be achieved through an
approval-style ballot.
3.4.3 Maximum of Random Variables
Let X ′∗ denote the maximum of the X
′
i’s, and let X
′
∗−i denote the maximum of all of
the X ′j’s other than X
′
i.
Let F∗(x) denote the CDF for X ′∗ and let f∗(x) denote the corresponding PDF.
Similarly, let F∗−i denote the CDF for X ′∗−i and let f∗−i(x) denote the corresponding
the PDF. Also, let F∗−i,j denote the CDF for X ′∗−i,j, where X
′
∗−i,j is the maximum of
all the X ′k’s other than X
′
i and X
′
j.
Then
F∗(x) =
m∏
i=1
Fi(x) (3.4)
since X ′∗ ≤ x if and only if each X ′i ≤ x, using independence.
87
As a consequence we get that
f∗(x) =
dF∗(x)
dx
(3.5)
=
∑
i
fi(x)
∏
j 6=i
Fj(x) (3.6)
=
∑
i
fi(x)F∗−i(x) . (3.7)
Similarly for F∗−i(x):
F∗−i(x) =
∏
j 6=i
Fj(x) (3.8)
f∗−i(x) =
dF∗−i(x)
dx
(3.9)
=
∑
j 6=i
fj(x)
∏
k 6=i,j
Fk(x) (3.10)
=
∑
j 6=i
fj(x)F∗−i,j(x) . (3.11)
The probability that X ′i is the maximum of the m variables X
′
1, . . . , X
′
m is∫ 1
0
fi(x)F∗−i(x) dx (3.12)
Roughly speaking, we sum the probability for each x that X ′i = x and that all other
X ′j are not larger than x.
3.5 Utility of a given ballot
Let b = (b1, b2, . . . , bm) denote a given range voting ballot, where each bi is in the
continuous interval [0, 1]. Let b = (b1, b2, . . . , bm) be the corresponding normalized
ballot, where each bi = bi/n and is in [0, 1/n].
What is the expected utility for Alice of casting a given ballot b?
The probability that Ai wins, if Alice casts ballot b, is
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∫ 1
0
fi(x)
(∏
j 6=i
Fj(x+ bi − bj)
)
dx (3.13)
Here fi(x) is the probability density of Ai receiving a total of x from the normalized
votes of the other voters, and Fj(x+ bi− bj) is the probability that X ′j + bj ≤ X ′i + bi.
Then Alice’s overall expected utility of casting ballot b is the sum, over each
alternative, of the utility for that alternative times the probability of that alternative
winning,
U(b) =
m∑
k=1
uk
∫ 1
0
fk(x)
(∏
j 6=k
Fj(x+ bk − bj)
)
dx (3.14)
For any given point (normalized ballot) b0, if U is differentiable at b0, then by
the definition of differentiability, we have
U(b) = U(b0) +∇U(b0) · (b− b0) +R(b), (3.15)
where R(b) is a remainder term such that limb→b0
|R(b)|
||b−b0|| = 0, and∇U is the gradient
of the function U .
Letting b0 = 0, we get
U(b) = U(0) +∇U(0) · b + o(1/n) . (3.16)
That is,
U(b) = U(0) +
∑
i
cibi + o(1/n) (3.17)
where
ci =
∂U
∂bi
∣∣
b=0
. (3.18)
Since the fi’s are assumed to be well-defined everywhere on the interval [0, 1], U
is differentiable everywhere on [0, 1/n]m (where differentiability at the endpoints is
one-sided). In particular, U is (one-sided) differentiable at 0.
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The partial derivative ∂U
∂bi
is equal to the following:
∂U
∂bi
= ui
∫ 1
0
fi(x)
[∑
6`=i
f`(x+ bi − b`)
∏
j 6=i,j 6=`
Fj(x+ bi − bj)
]
dx
+
∑
k 6=i
uk
∫ 1
0
fk(x)(−fi(x+ bk − bi))
∏
j 6=i,j 6=k
Fj(x+ bk − bj) dx
(3.19)
Evaluating ∂U
∂bi
at b = 0, we get
ci = ui
∫ 1
0
fi(x)
[∑
`6=i
f`(x)
∏
j 6=i,`
Fj(x)
]
dx
+
∑
k 6=i
uk
∫ 1
0
fk(x)(−fi(x))
∏
j 6=i,k
Fj(x) dx
=
∑
k 6=i
(ui − uk)
∫ 1
0
fi(x)fk(x)
∏
j 6=i,j 6=k
Fj(x) dx
Thus, ci =
∂U
∂bi
∣∣
b=0
=
∑
k 6=i(ui − uk)τik, where
τik =
∫ 1
0
fi(x)fk(x)
∏
j 6=i,j 6=k
Fj(x) dx
is related to the approximate probability that Ai and Ak are in a near tie for winner.
More precisely, τikbi is the approximate probability that adding a normalized score
of bi (instead of 0) to Ai’s total causes Ai to be the winner when otherwise Ak would
be the winner.
Since the remainder term R(b) is o(1/n), as the number of voters grows large
(n → ∞), the remainder term is dominated, and the utility U(b) of a normalized
ballot b is well-approximated by
U(0) +
∑
i
cibi.
Then, when the number of voters is large, the best range voting ballot for Alice
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will be (b1, . . . , bm), where
bi =
 1 if ci > 00 otherwise. (3.20)
Remarks. It is important to note that as we vary the number of voters, the prob-
ability density functions fi (and the corresponding cumulative distribution functions
Fi) stay fixed. That is, we fix the fi summarizing Alice’s beliefs about how the aver-
age scores from the other voters for each alternative are distributed; then, in the limit
as the number of voters gets large, the linear approximation is a good approximation,
and Alice’s best range voting ballot is an approval-style ballot as given above.
Also, while we showed that an optimal strategy can be achieved by an approval-
style ballot, we cannot conclude anything about whether such a ballot is sincere or
not in general. In fact, as we will see in Section 3.6, for some choices of fi’s and ui’s,
the optimal ballot computed as above is not sincere.
Deriving previous assumptions from our model. We showed above that τikbi
is the approximate probability that adding a normalized score of bi to Ai makes Ai
the winner when otherwise Ak would be the winner. Thus, we have formally derived
under general conditions the assumption used by Smith [52] that the probability of
an individual voter’s ballot breaking a pairwise tie for winner is proportional to the
difference in her scores for the two alternatives.
The assumption that Smith used that ties among three or more candidates can
be ignored can also be derived from our general model. In the expression for the
utility of a ballot, terms involving three-way ties are captured by second order partial
derivatives. Applying the definition of differentiability as in Equation 3.15 we see
that higher order partial derivative terms can be ignored (as the number of voters
approaches ∞) because they add up to o(1/n).
The fact that three-way tie probabilities are not negligible in Laslier’s model does
not contradict the previous observations. In the trembling ballot model, the prob-
ability density functions fi are not fixed as n varies, so we cannot apply the same
analysis.
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Deriving mean-based thresholding from our model. It is straightforward to
see that when all pairwise ties are assumed to be equally probable, then τik is the
same for all pairs i, k, so in the limit as n → ∞, an individual voter’s best strategy
is to give a score of 1 to those alternatives Ai for which Σk 6=i(ui − uk) > 0. This is
exactly the same condition as mean-based thresholding.
3.6 Beta Distributions
In this section, we propose beta distributions as a somewhat natural and realistic
model for a voter’s subjective information about the other votes. Beta distributions
are a common choice for a Bayesian prior distribution [23]. To the best of our knowl-
edge, beta distributions have not been considered in the context of range and approval
voting.
The beta distribution is a continuous probability distribution over [0, 1], parame-
terized by two “shape” parameters, α and β.
If X is drawn from the beta distribution with parameters α and β (denoted
Beta(α, β)), then its density function is
f(x;α, β) =
xα−1(1− x)β−1
B(α, β)
(3.21)
where
B(α, β) =
Γ(α)Γ(β)
Γ(α + β)
(3.22)
and
Γ(n) = (n− 1)! (3.23)
for integer values of n.
The cumulative distribution function F (x;α, β) is given by
F (x;α, β) =
B(x;α, β)
B(α, β)
(3.24)
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Figure 3-1: Beta probability density function (PDF) for several values of α and β.
where
B(x;α, β) =
∫ x
0
tα−1(1− t)β−1 dt. (3.25)
The beta distribution Beta(α, β) represents the Bayesian posterior distribution of
a probability p after observing α−1 successes and β−1 failures in α+β−2 Bernoulli
trials with unknown probability p, with a uniform prior (see, e.g., Evans et al. [23],
Chapter 5). The distribution Beta(1,1) is the uniform distribution.
We propose using a beta distribution to represent the distribution of the average
score (between 0 and 1) given to an alternative by the other votes, or in an approval
voting setting, the fraction of voters approving of an alternative.
In an approval voting setting, we could imagine that pre-election polls announce
the number of voters approving of each candidate out of some random sample of
voters. Thus, if in a sample of 20 voters there were 5 voters approving of alternative
A1, we could model f1 and F1 using the beta distribution with α = 6 and β = 16.
The integrals can be evaluated explicitly, e.g. using Sage, for fixed values of m, α,
and β.
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Figure 3-1 shows beta PDFs for some sample values of α and β.
Example 3.6.1. For example, suppose we are using approval voting. Let m = 4 and
suppose a pre-election poll was conducted on a sample of 5 voters. In this sample,
2 voters approved A1, 1 voter approved A2, 4 voters approved A3, and 5 voters
approved A4. Then we would model Alice’s information about the how the other
voters will vote as follows: f1(x) = f(x; 3, 4), f2(x) = f(x; 2, 5), f3(x) = f(x; 5, 2),
and f4(x) = f(x; 6, 1). Suppose Alice’s utilities are u1 = 0, u2 = 5, u3 = 7, and
u4 = 10. Then, computing the ci’s from Section 3.5 using Sage, we get c1 = −1.47,
c2 = −0.101, c3 = −4.33, and c4 = 5.90. Therefore, in the limit as the number of
voters grows large, Alice’s best strategy is to approve of only A4.
When modeling a voter’s information using beta distributions, the optimal strat-
egy is not always sincere, as shown in the following example.
Example 3.6.2. Suppose m = 6, and Alice’s information about the other voters is
modeled by f1(x) = f(x; 15, 10), f2(x) = f(x; 13, 8), f3(x) = f(x; 13, 19), f4(x) =
f(x; 3, 4), f5(x) = f(x; 6, 2), f6(x) = f(x; 15, 16). Suppose Alice’s utilities are u =
(0, 5, 9, 10, 16, 22). Then we get c1 = −15.4, c2 = −9.72, c3 = 0.0206, c4 = −0.0347,
c5 = 22.1, c6 = 3.13, indicating that the optimal strategy in the limit as n→∞ is to
approve alternatives A3, A5, A6 and disapprove alternatives A1, A2, A4. This is not a
sincere strategy for Alice, since it approves of A3 and disapproves of A4, when Alice
prefers A4 to A3 (her utilities are u3 = 9 and u4 = 10).
By examining the tie densities τik, we can roughly interpret the situation as follows:
a pairwise tie between A3 and A4 is much more likely than any other pairwise tie,
and in that pairwise tie Alice would like A4 to win; therefore, she should disapprove
A3 and approve A4.
3.7 Conclusions and Open Questions
In this chapter, we studied strategic voting in the context of range voting, and asked
when a voter’s best strategy can be achieved by an approval vote. We reviewed known
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results on strategic range voting and approval voting in different models. We then
proposed a general way of modeling a range voter’s information about other votes –
using an independent probability distribution for the average score each alternative
receives from other voters. In this model, we showed that in the limit as the number
of voters grows large, a voter’s optimal strategy (computable by evaluating integrals
using, e.g., Sage) can be achieved by an approval-style vote. This result may be
interpreted to mean that, in some sense, when the number of voters is large, the
added expressiveness of range voting over approval voting is not usually useful; in
fact, using the added expressiveness of range voting would lower a voter’s expected
utility for the election outcome.
More concretely, we proposed beta distributions as a plausible way to model a
voter’s information, especially in an approval voting setting when there is pre-election
poll data from which a voter may form her opinions about how others will actually
vote. Even without pre-election approval polls, a voter may be able to provide an
α and a β representing her subjective prior information for each alternative. We
observed that with beta distributions, the optimal range or approval vote even in the
limit of a large number of voters is not always sincere. An interesting open question
is to formulate a set of clean conditions under which the optimal range or approval
vote is or is not sincere.
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Chapter 4
Statistical Robustness of Voting
Rules
4.1 Introduction
It is well known that polling a sample of voters before an election may yield useful
information about the likely outcome of the election, if the sample is large enough
and the voters respond honestly.
It is less well known that the effectiveness of a sample in predicting an election
outcome also depends on the voting rule (social choice function) used.
In this chapter, we introduce a notion of “statistical robustness” for voting rules.
We say a voting rule is statistically robust if for any profile (a set of ballots) the winner
of any random sample of that profile is most likely to be the same as the (most likely)
winner for the complete profile. While the sample result may be “noisy” due to sample
variations, if the voting rule is statistically robust the most common winner(s) for a
sample will be the same as the winner(s) of the complete profile.
To coin some amusing terminology, we might say that a statistically robust vot-
ing rule is “weather-resistant”—you expect to get the same election outcome if the
election day weather is sunny (when all voters show up at the polls) as you get on a
rainy day (when only some fraction of the voters show up). We assume here that the
chance of a voter showing up on a rainy day is independent of her preferences.
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We consider the property of being statistically robust a desirable one for a voting
rule, and thus consider lack of such statistical robustness somewhat of a defect in
voting rules. In general, we consider a voting rule to be somewhat defective if applying
the voting rule to a sample of the ballots may give misleading guidance regarding the
likely winner for the entire profile.
If a voting rule is not statistically robust, then if for any reason some ballots are
lost and not counted in an election, the election outcome may very likely change, even
if the lost ballots are random and not maliciously chosen.
Another reason statistical robustness may be desirable is for post-election au-
diting. “Ballot-polling auditing” [43] attempts to confirm the result of an election
by examining randomly sampled ballots (similar to an exit poll, except the audit is
polling ballots, not voters), until there is strong statistical evidence that the reported
outcome is correct. Ballot-polling auditing methods are currently designed for plu-
rality voting, where each ballot that is a vote for the reported winner increases the
confidence that the reported outcome is correct. However, for a voting rule that is
not statistically robust, the result of a sample is not necessarily a good indication of
the result of the entire election. It is unclear how ballot-polling auditing would work
for voting rules that are not statistically robust.
We note that Bayesian auditing [49], a recently proposed audit method, does not
restrict the voting rule to be one that is statistically robust. In a Bayesian audit,
ballots are randomly selected and examined until the computed probability that the
reported winner is the actual winner of the entire profile exceeds some threshold. The
winning probabilities are computed by using a posterior distribution given the sample
and a prior to generate likely ways of “completing” the sample to a full profile, and
using the voting rule to determine the winner of each completion. Thus, there is no
assumption that the winner of a sample is a good prediction of the winner of the
entire profile.
Similarly, in an AI system that combines the recommendations of expert sub-
systems according to some aggregation rule, it may be of interest to know whether
aggregating the recommendations of a sample of the experts is most likely to yield the
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same result as aggregating the recommendations of all experts. In some situations,
some experts may have transient faults or be otherwise temporarily unavailable (in a
manner independent of their recommendations) so that only a sample of recommen-
dations is available for aggregation.
Related work. Since our definition is new, there is little or no directly related
previous work. The closest work may be that of Walsh and Xia [59], who study
various “lot-based” voting rules with respect to their computational resistance to
strategic voting. In their terminology, a voting rule of the form “Lottery-Then-X”
(a.k.a. “LotThenX”) first takes a random sample of the ballots, and then applies
voting rule X (where X may be plurality, Borda, etc.) to the sample. Their work
is not concerned, as ours is, with the fidelity of the sample winner to the winner for
the complete profile. Amar [3] proposes actual use of the “random ballot” method.
Procaccia et al. [48] study a related but different notion of “robustness” that models
the effect of voter errors; that is, robustness describes the resistance of a voting rule to
some number of changes or “faults” in the votes. Another line of related work studies
voting rules as maximum likelihood estimators [60, 17, 47], where it is assumed that
there is a “true” ranking of the alternatives and the votes are noisy estimates of this
ranking; then, the goal of a voting rule is to produce a ranking that is most likely to
be the true ranking, based on a sample drawn from some noise model.
Our results. We define the notion of statistical robustness, with respect to three
sampling methods: sampling without replacement, sampling with replacement, and
binomial sampling. We then determine whether several voting rules are statistically
robust. We show that plurality, veto, and random ballot are statistically robust, with
respect to all three sampling methods. We show that other common voting rules –
approval voting, single transferable vote (STV), Borda, Copeland, and Maximin – are
not statistically robust, with respect to one or more of the above sampling methods.
Furthermore, we show that any positional scoring rule whose score vector contains at
least three distinct values (i.e., any positional scoring rule that is not equivalent to
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“approve t” for some t) is not statistically robust, with respect to sampling with or
without replacement.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces notation
and the voting rules we consider. We define the notion of statistical robustness
for a voting rule in Section 4.3, determine whether several familiar voting rules are
statistically robust in Section 4.4, and close with some discussion and open questions
in Section 4.5.
4.2 Preliminaries
Ballots, Profiles, Alternatives. Assume a profile P = (B1, B2, . . . , Bn) contain-
ing n ballots will be used to determine a single winner from a
set A = {A1, A2, . . . , Am} of m alternatives. There are various possibilities for the
form of a ballot; the form of a ballot must be compatible with the voting rule used.
We may view a profile as either a sequence or a multiset; it may contain repeated
items (identical ballots).
Voting rules. Assume that a voting rule (social choice function) f maps profiles
to a single outcome (one of the alternatives): for any profile P , f(P ) produces the
winner for the profile P .
We allow f to be randomized, in order for ties to be handled reasonably. Our
definition could alternatively have allowed f to output the set of tied winners; we
prefer allowing randomization, so that f always outputs a single alternative. In our
analysis, however, we do consider the set ML(f(P )) of most likely winners for a given
profile.
Thus, we say that A is a “most likely winner” of P if no other alternative is more
likely to be f(P ). There may be several most likely winners of a profile P . For most
profiles and most voting rules, however, we expect f to act deterministically, so there
is a single most likely winner.
Often the social choice function f will be neutral—symmetric with respect to
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the alternatives—so that changing the names of the alternatives won’t change the
outcome distribution of f on any profile. While there is nothing in our definition that
requires that f be neutral, we shall restrict attention in this chapter to neutral social
choice functions. Thus, in particular, we will suppose that a tie-breaking rule used
by any f in this chapter will not depend on the names of the alternatives; it will pick
one of the tied alternatives uniformly at random.
We do assume that social-choice function f is anonymous—symmetric with re-
spect to voters: reordering the ballots of a profile leaves the outcome unchanged.
We will consider the following voting rules. (For more details on voting rules, see
Brams and Fishburn [14], for example.)
The following voting rules are preferential voting rules; that is, each ballot Bi gives
a linear order Ai1  Ai2  . . .  Aim, indicating that alternative Ai1 is preferred to
Ai2, which is preferred to Ai3, and so on. (In the rest of the chapter, we will omit the
 symbols and just write Ai1Ai2 . . . Aim, for example.)
For a preferential voting rule, a “pairwise election” between two alternatives Ai
and Aj compares the number ni,j of ballots that rank Ai above Aj to the number
nj,i of ballots that rank Aj to Ai. Then the difference ni,j − nj,i is Ai’s score in the
pairwise election, and similarly, nj,i − ni,j is Aj’s score in the pairwise election. If
ni,j − nj,i > 0, then Ai wins the pairwise election.
• A positional scoring rule is defined by a vector ~α = 〈α1, . . . , αm〉; we assume
αi ≥ αj for i ≤ j. We will also assume αi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . ,m, although this is
not necessary.
Alternative Ai gets αj points for every ballot that ranks alternative Ai in the
jth position. The winner is the alternative that receives the most points.
Some examples of positional scoring rules are:
Plurality : ~α = 〈1, 0, . . . , 0〉
Veto: ~α = 〈1, . . . , 1, 0〉
Borda: ~α = 〈m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 0〉
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• Single-transferable vote (STV) (also known as instant-runoff voting (IRV)): The
election proceeds in m rounds. In each round, each ballot is counted as a vote
for its highest-ranked alternative that has not yet been eliminated, and the
alternative with the fewest votes is eliminated. The winner of the election is
the last alternative remaining.
• Plurality with runoff : The winner is the winner of the pairwise election between
the two alternatives that receive the most first-choice votes.
• Copeland : The winner is an alternative that maximizes the number of alterna-
tives it beats in pairwise elections.
• Maximin: The winner is an alternative whose lowest score in any pairwise
election against another alternative is the greatest among all the alternatives.
We also consider the following voting rules that are not preferential:
• Score voting (also known as range voting): Each allowable ballot type is asso-
ciated with a vector that specifies a score for each alternative. The winner is
the alternative that maximizes its total score.
• Approval [12, 41]: Each ballot gives a score of 1 or 0 to each alternative. The
winner is an alternative whose total score is maximized.
• Random ballot [32] (also known as random dictator): A single ballot is selected
uniformly at random from the profile, and the alternative named on the selected
ballot is the winner of the election. Note that random ballot may also be thought
of as a preferential voting rule, in which a random ballot is selected, and the
alternative ranked first on that selected ballot is the winner of the election.
4.3 Sampling and Statistical Robustness
Sampling. The profile P is the universe from which the sample will be drawn.
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We define a sampling process to be a randomized function G that takes as input
a profile P of size n and an integer parameter k (1 ≤ k ≤ n) and produces as output
a sample S of P of expected size k, where S is a subset (or sub-multiset) of P .
We consider three kinds of sampling:
• Sampling without replacement. Here GWOR(P, k) produces a set S of size exactly
k chosen uniformly without replacement from P .
• Sampling with replacement. Here GWR(P, k) produces a multiset S of size ex-
actly k chosen uniformly with replacement from P .
• Binomial sampling. Here GBIN(P, k) produces a sample S of expected size k
by including each ballot in P in the sample S independently with probability
p = k/n.
We write f(G(P, k)) to denote the output of the voting rule f on the sample
output by G(P, k); note that f may be randomized, to break ties, for example.
Statistically Robust Voting Rules. We now give our main definitions.
Definition 4.3.1. IfX is a discrete random variable (or more generally, some function
whose range is a finite set), we let ML(X) denote the set of values that X takes with
maximum probability. That is,
ML(X) = {x | Pr(X = x) is maximum}
denotes the set of “most likely” possibilities for the value of X.
For any (possibly randomized) voting rule f and profile P , we will call f(P )
a random variable, even though it is not real-valued (it outputs an alternative Ai).
Then, ML(f(P )) contains the “most likely winner(s)” for voting rule f and profile P ;
typically this will contain just a single alternative. Similarly, ML(f(G(P, k))) con-
tains the most likely winner(s) of a sample of expected size k. Note that ML(f(P ))
involves randomization only within f (if any, presumably to break ties), whereas
ML(f(G(P, k))) also involves the randomization of sampling by G.
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Definition 4.3.2. We say that a social choice function f is statistically robust for
sampling rule G if for any profile P of size n and for any sample size k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n},
ML(f(G(P, k))) = ML(f(P )) .
That is, an alternative is a most likely winner for a sample of size k if and only if it
is a most likely winner for the entire profile P .
We will also sometimes parameterize the definition by the sample size k and talk
about “k-statistical robustness”.
Definition 4.3.3. We say that a social choice function f is k-statistically robust for
sampling rule G if for any profile P of size n > k,
ML(f(G(P, k))) = ML(f(P )) .
When we talk about statistical robustness without reference to a specific sample
size, we mean statistical robustness for all sample sizes.
Note that these definitions work smoothly with ties: if the original profile P was
tied (i.e., there is more than one most likely winner of P ), then the definition requires
that all most likely winners of P have maximum probability of being a winner in a
sample (and that no other alternatives will have such maximum probability).
Having a statistically robust voting rule is something like having an “unbiased
estimator” in classical statistics. However, we are not interested in estimating some
linear combination of the individual elements (as with classical statistics), but rather
in knowing which alternative is most likely (i.e., which is the winner), a computation
that may be a highly nonlinear function of the ballots.
A simple plurality example. Suppose we have a plurality election with 10 votes:
6 for A1, 3 for A2, and 1 for A3. We try all three sampling methods, all possible
values of k, and see how often each alternative is a winner in 1000 trials; Figure 4-1
reports the results, illustrating the statistical robustness of plurality voting, a fact we
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GWOR
k A1 A2 A3
1 594 303 103
2 625 258 117
3 727 217 56
4 794 206 0
5 838 162 0
6 868 132 0
7 920 80 0
8 1000 0 0
9 1000 0 0
10 1000 0 0
GWR
k A1 A2 A3
1 597 299 104
2 569 325 106
3 676 260 64
4 718 256 26
5 749 219 32
6 764 212 24
7 804 181 15
8 818 171 11
9 842 146 12
10 847 150 3
GBIN
k A1 A2 A3
1 507 315 178
2 619 277 104
3 698 235 67
4 763 212 25
5 822 161 17
6 879 117 4
7 930 70 0
8 973 27 0
9 993 7 0
10 1000 0 0
Figure 4-1: Plurality voting with three sampling schemes on a profile P with ten votes:
6 forA1, 3 forA2, and 1 forA3. 1000 trials were run for each sample size, with expected
sample sizes running from k = 1 to k = 10. The entry indicates how many trials
each alternative won, with ties broken by uniform random selection. (The perhaps
surprisingly large value for A3 of 178 for GBIN results from the likelihood of an empty
sample when k = 1; such ties are broken randomly.) Note that ML(G(P, k)) = A1
for all three sampling methods G and all sample sizes k.
prove in Section 4.4.4.
We will show that plurality is statistically robust under all three sampling meth-
ods.
We will use the fact that statistical robustness for sampling without replacement
implies statistical robustness for binomial sampling.
Theorem 4.3.4. If a voting rule f is statistically robust for sampling without re-
placement, then f is statistically robust under binomial sampling.
Proof. The probability that an alternative Ai wins in a sample produced by binomial
sampling is the sum over all possible sample sizes k of the probability that the sample
size is k times the probability that Ai wins in a uniform random sample of size k.
When binomial sampling returns an empty sample, then, with a neutral tie-
breaking rule, every alternative is equally likely to be the winner. For non-empty
samples, by the assumption of statistical robustness for sampling without replace-
ment, for any k > 0, f(P ) is the most likely winner of a uniform random sample of
size k.
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Therefore, f(P ) is the most likely winner of a sample produced by binomial sam-
pling for any positive probability p.
4.4 Statistical Robustness of Various Voting Rules
In this section, we analyze whether various voting rules are statistically robust.
4.4.1 Unanimous Preferential Voting Rules
It turns out that for most preferential voting rules f , if f is 1-statistically robust for
sampling with or without replacement, then f must be the plurality voting rule (or
random ballot).
The following theorem was observed by the anonymous reviewers of AAAI-12.
Theorem 4.4.1. Suppose f is a preferential voting rule with the following prop-
erty, which we call single unanimity: if P consists of a single ballot (linear order)
Ai1 . . . Aim, then f(P ) = Ai1. Then if f is 1-statistically robust for sampling with or
without replacement, then for any profile P the set of most likely winners ML(f(P ))
is equal to the set of plurality winners ML(plur(P )), where plur denotes the plurality
voting rule.
Proof. If f is 1-statistically robust for sampling with or without replacement, then
for any profile P , ML(f(G(P, 1))) = ML(f(P )), where G is GWOR or GWR. For
any sample of P of size 1, the winner of that sample will be the alternative listed at
the top of that ballot. Therefore, the most likely winner of a sample of size 1 is the
alternative that is listed at the top of the ballot the most times, which is by definition
the plurality winner. In the case of a plurality tie, the set of most likely winners of a
sample of size 1 is equal to the set of most likely plurality winners (the alternatives
that are tied for the most first-choice votes). Thus, ML(f(G(P, 1)) = ML(plur(P )).
Therefore, ML(f(P )) = ML(plur(P )).
Note that the standard property of unanimity is sufficient (but not necessary) for
the single unanimity property used above. (A voting rule f is unanimous if, when P
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consists of ballots that are all the same linear order, f(P ) selects the alternative at
the top of that linear order as the winner.)
All of the preferential voting rules listed in Section 4.2, except veto (and any other
positional scoring rule for which α1 = α2), are unanimous. (Veto and other positional
scoring rules for which α1 = α2 are not unanimous because for a profile consisting
of a single ballot, there will be a tie between at least the first two alternatives listed
on that ballot, so the winner will not necessarily be the first alternative listed on the
ballot.)
Thus, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The following voting rules are not 1-statistically robust: STV, plurality
with runoff, Copeland, Maximin, and Borda (and any positional scoring rule defined
by 〈α1, . . . , αm〉 for which α1 > α2).
Note that Theorem 4.4.1 says that the most likely winner of P under f is the
plurality winner of P . This is slightly different from saying that f is the same as
plurality. For example, f could be the random ballot rule; the most likely winner of a
profile P under the random ballot method is the same as the plurality winner of P . Or,
f could be even be some kind of “hybrid” that sometimes performs plurality and other
times performs random ballot. For practical purposes, we will interpret Theorem 4.4.1
to say that any (singly) unanimous preferential voting rule that is 1-statistically robust
for sampling with and without replacement must be either plurality or random ballot.
However, the theorem does not actually say whether plurality or random ballot
themselves are statistically robust. We will prove that plurality and random ballot are
in fact statistically robust. The theorem covers statistical robustness (for samples of
size 1) for sampling with and without replacement, but not binomial sampling. In the
following subsections we will give some non-robustness results for various unanimous
preferential voting rules under binomial sampling.
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4.4.2 Random Ballot
Theorem 4.4.2. The random ballot method is statistically robust for each of the
sampling methods GWR, GWOR, and GBIN .
Proof. When the random ballot method is applied to the entire profile or to a sample
obtained using any of the three sampling methods, each ballot is equally likely to be
chosen as the one to name the winner.
4.4.3 Score Voting
Theorem 4.4.3. Score voting is not statistically robust for any of the three sampling
methods GWR,GWOR, and GBIN .
Proof. By means of a counterexample. Consider the following profile:
(1) A1 : 100, A2 : 0
(99) A1 : 0, A2 : 1
There is one vote that gives scores of 100 for A1 and 0 for A2, and 99 votes that
gives scores of 0 for A1 and 1 for A2. A1 wins the complete profile, since it has a total
score of 100, while A2 has a total score of 99.
Under binomial sampling with probability p, A1 wins with probability about p
— that is, with about the probability A1’s vote is included in the sample. (The
probability is not exactly p because the binomial sampling may produce an empty
sample, in which case A1 and A2 will be equally likely to be selected as the winner.)
For p < 1/2, A2 wins more than half the time; thus score voting is not robust
under binomial sampling.
Similarly, for sampling with or without replacement for small sample sizes k, the
probability that the one ballot with a score of 100 for A1 will be included in the
sample will be small, so A2 will be more likely to win the sample. Thus, score voting
is not robust under sampling with or without replacement.
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4.4.4 Plurality
Throughout this section, we let ni denote the number of votes alternative Ai receives,
with
∑
i ni = n.
We prove that plurality voting is statistically robust for all three sampling meth-
ods.
Theorem 4.4.4. Plurality voting is statistically robust, with sampling without re-
placement.
Proof. Assume n1 > n2 ≥ . . . ≥ nm, so A1 is the unique winner of the complete
profile. (The proof below can easily be adapted to show that plurality is statistically
robust when the complete profile has a tie for the winner.)
Let K = (k1, k2, ..., km) denote the number of votes for the various alternatives
within the sample of size k.
Let
(
a
b
)
denote the binomial coefficient “a choose b”, equal to a!/(b!(a−b)!). There
are
(
n
k
)
ways to choose a sample of size k from the profile of size n.
The probability of a given configuration K is equal to
Pr(K) = (
m∏
i=1
(
ni
ki
)
)/
(
n
k
)
.
Let γ(i) denote the probability that Ai wins the election, and let γ(i, kmax) denote
the probability that Ai receives kmax votes and wins the election.
Then γ(i) =
∑
kmax
γ(i, kmax), and γ(i, kmax) =
∑
K∈K Pr(K)/Tied(K), where K
is the set of configurations K such that ki = kmax and kj ≤ kmax for all j 6= i, and
Tied(K) is the number of alternatives tied for the maximum score in K. Note that
Tied(K) is the total number of tied alternatives; typically, Tied(K) will be 1 (when
there is a unique winner and no tie). The above equation depends on the tie-breaking
rule being neutral.
For any kmax, consider now a particular configuration K used in computing
γ(1, kmax): K = (k1, k2, ..., km), where k1 = kmax and ki ≤ kmax for i > 1. Then
Pr(K) = (
∏m
i=1
(
ni
ki
)
)/
(
n
k
)
.
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Now consider the corresponding configuration K ′ used in computing γ(2, kmax),
where k1 and k2 are switched: K
′ = (k2, k1, k3, ..., km). Then
Pr(K ′) = (
(
n1
k2
)(
n2
k1
)∏m
i=3
(
ni
ki
)
)/
(
n
k
)
.
By Lemma 4.4.5 below, we have Pr(K) > Pr(K ′).
Each configuration K ′ used in computing γ(2, kmax) has such a corresponding
configuration K used in computing γ(1, kmax). Thus, γ(1, kmax) > γ(2, kmax).
Since γ(1, kmax) > γ(2, kmax) for any kmax, we have that γ(1) > γ(2); that is, A1
is more likely to be the winner of the sample than A2.
By a similar argument, for every i > 1, γ(1, kmax) ≥ γ(i, kmax) for any kmax, so
γ(1) > γ(i). Therefore, A1 is the most likely to win the sample.
Lemma 4.4.5. If n1 > n2, k1 > k2, n1 ≥ k1, and n2 ≥ k2, then
(
n1
k1
)(
n2
k2
)
>
(
n1
k2
)(
n2
k1
)
.
Proof. We wish to show that
(
n1
k1
)(
n2
k2
)
>
(
n1
k2
)(
n2
k1
)
. (4.1)
If n2 < k1, then
(
n1
k2
)(
n2
k1
)
= 0, so (4.1) is trivially true.
If n2 ≥ k1, then we can rewrite (4.1) as
(
n1
k1
)
/
(
n2
k1
)
>
(
n1
k2
)
/
(
n2
k2
)
. So it suffices to
show that for n1 > n2,
(
n1
k
)
/
(
n2
k
)
is increasing with k, which is easily verified.
Theorem 4.4.6. Plurality voting is statistically robust, under binomial sampling.
Proof. Follows from Theorems 4.4.4 and 4.3.4.
Theorem 4.4.7. Plurality is statistically robust, under sampling with replacement.
Proof. The proof follows the same structure as for sampling without replacement.
Again, assume n1 > n2 ≥ . . . ≥ nm.
For each configuration K used in computing γ(1, kmax) and the corresponding
configuration K ′ used in computing γ(2, kmax), we show that Pr(K) > Pr(K ′).
Under sampling with replacement, the probability of a
configuration K = (k1, . . . , km) is equal to
Pr(K) =
(
k
k1, . . . , km
) m∏
i=1
(ni
n
)ki
,
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where
(
k
k1,...,km
)
denotes the multinomial coefficient, equal to k!/(k1! . . . km!).
For any configuration K used in computing γ(1, kmax), consider the corresponding
configuration K ′, obtained by swapping k1 and k2, used in computing in γ(2, kmax):
K ′ = (k2, k1, k3, . . . , km). Then
Pr(K ′) =
(
k
k1, . . . , km
)(n2
n
)k1 (n1
n
)k2 m∏
i=3
(ni
n
)ki
.
So Pr(K) = (n1/n2)
(k1−k2) Pr(K ′). If n1 > n2 and k1 > k2, then Pr(K) > Pr(K ′).
If n1 > n2 and k1 = k2, then Pr(K) = Pr(K
′). Thus, γ(1, kmax) > γ(2, kmax) for every
kmax, and therefore, A1 is more likely than A2 to win a sample without replacement.
By a similar argument, for every i > 1, γ(1, kmax) ≥ γ(i, kmax) for any kmax, so
γ(1) > γ(i). Therefore, A1 is most likely to win the sample.
4.4.5 Veto
Theorem 4.4.8. Veto is statistically robust.
Proof. Each ballot can be thought of as a vote for the least-preferred alternative; the
winner is the alternative who receives the fewest votes.
For plurality, we showed that the alternative who receives the most votes in the
complete profile is the most likely to receive the most votes for a random sample. By
symmetry, the same arguments can be used to show that the alternative who receives
the fewest votes in the complete profile is the most likely to receive the fewest votes
in a random sample. Thus, the winner of a veto election is the most likely to win in
a random sample.
4.4.6 Approval Voting
We had conjectured that statistical robustness would hold for approval voting, thus
distinguishing it from voting rules with more complex behavior, such as STV. Some-
what surprisingly, approval voting is not statistically robust.
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Theorem 4.4.9. Approval voting is not k-statistically robust for any k, for any of
the three sampling methods GWR, GWOR, GBIN .
Proof. Proof by counterexample. Consider the following profile P :
(r) {A1}
(r) {A2, A3}
There are 3 alternatives A1, A2, A3. There are r ballots that approve of A1 only
and r ballots that approve of A2 and A3. Each alternative receives r votes, so each
wins the election with probability 1/3.
For a sample of any size k, we can express the sample as (k1, k2), where k1 is the
number of ballots for A1 and k2 is the number of ballots for {A2, A3}, and k1+k2 = k.
If k1 = k2, then all three alternatives A1, A2, and A3 are equally likely to win. If
k1 > k2, then A1 wins, and if k2 > k1, then A2 and A3 each win with probability
1/2. Since the profile P contains an equal number of ballots of the two types, the
probability that k1 > k2 is equal to the probability that k2 > k1. Therefore, A1 is
more likely than either A2 or A3 to win. Thus, approval voting is not k-statistically
robust for any k under sampling with or without replacement.
Similarly, for binomial sampling for any probability p, although the sample size k
is not fixed, we can again write any sample as (k1, k2), and using the same argument
as above, we have that A1 is more likely than either A2 or A3 to win. Thus, approval
voting is not robust under binomial sampling.
Intuitively, the non-robustness in the above example comes from the correlations
in the votes for the various alternatives. Whenever A2 gets a vote, A3 also gets a
vote, so A2 can only ever win in a tie with A3, while A1 can win outright.
Note that the example above also shows that for approval voting there does not
even exist a threshold τ such that for any sample of size k at least τ , approval voting
is k-statistically robust
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4.4.7 Plurality with Runoff
By Theorem 4.4.1, we know that plurality with runoff is not 1-statistically robust for
sampling with or without replacement. Here we will show that plurality with runoff
is not statistically robust for binomial sampling for any probability p.
Theorem 4.4.10. Plurality with runoff is not statistically robust for binomial sam-
pling for any probability p.
Proof. Proof by counterexample. Choose r to be a large integer, and consider the
following profile P :
(r) A1 A3 A2
(r) A2 A3 A1
(r − 1) A3 A1 A2
In this profile, A1 and A2 have the most first-choice votes, so the runoff is between
A1 and A2. In the pairwise election, A1 receives 2r − 1 votes, while A2 receives r
votes, so A1 wins.
Suppose we perform binomial sampling with probability p. Let ni be the number
of ballots in the sample that list Ai first. Each ni is a binomial random variable, with
mean rp for A1 and A2, and (r − 1)p for A3.
Note that n1 and n2 are identically distributed, and for any fixed p, as r gets large,
n3 becomes distributed nearly identically to n1 and n2.
For simplicity, assume that two of the alternatives strictly have the most first-
choice votes (i.e., there is no tie that needs to be broken to determine which two
alternatives go into the runoff). (Since the ni’s are nearly identically distributed for
large r, by symmetry the following arguments can be easily adapted to the case of
ties.)
If n1 is the minimum of the ni’s, then the runoff is between A2 and A3. A2 receives
n2 votes and A3 receives n3 +n1 votes, so A3 is likely to win. Let prunoff denote A3’s
probability of winning in the case of a runoff between A2 and A3.
If n2 is the minimum of the ni’s, then the runoff is between A1 and A3. A1 receives
n1 votes and A3 receives n3+n2 votes, so A3 is likely to win. (A3 wins with probability
prunoff .)
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If n3 is the minimum of the ni’s, then the runoff is between A1 and A2. A1 receives
n1 + n3 votes, and A2 receives n2 votes, so A1 is likely to win. When r is large so the
ni’s are distributed nearly identically, A1 wins with probability about prunoff .
For large r, since the three possible runoffs are almost equally likely, A3 is about
twice as likely as A1 to win when the sample is selected using binomial sampling with
any fixed probability p.
4.4.8 Single Transferable Vote (STV)
By Theorem 4.4.1, we know that STV is not 1-statistically robust for sampling with
or without replacement.
Here we show that STV is not statistically robust for binomial sampling.
Theorem 4.4.11. STV is not statistically robust for binomial sampling for any prob-
ability p.
Proof. Plurality with runoff and STV are identical when there are three (or fewer)
candidates, so the counterexample given in the proof of Theorem 4.4.10 is also a
counterexample for STV, showing that STV is not statistically robust for binomial
sampling for any probability p.
Here, we give another counterexample, for an arbitrary number of candidates m.
We construct a profile for which the winner is very unlikely to be the winner in
any smaller sample. Choose m (the number of alternatives) and r (a “replication
factor”) both as large integers.
The profile will consist of n = mr ballots:
(r + 1) A1 Am . . .
(r) A2 Am A1 . . .
(r) A3 Am A1 . . .
...
(r) Am−1 Am A1 . . .
(r − 1) Am A1 . . .
where the specified alternatives appear at the front of the ballots, and “. . .” indicates
that the order of the other lower-ranked alternatives is irrelevant.
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In this profile, Am is eliminated first, then A2, . . . , Am−1 in some order, until A1
wins.
Suppose now that binomial sampling is performed, with each ballot retained with
probability p. Let ni be the number of ballots retained that list Ai first. Each ni is
a binomial random variable with mean (r + 1)p (for A1), rp (for A2, . . . , Am−1), and
(r − 1)p (for Am).
Claim 1: The probability that nm = 0 goes to 0, for any fixed p, as r →∞.
Claim 2: The probability that there exists an i, 1 ≤ i < m, such that ni < nm,
goes to 1 as m, r →∞.
Note that as r gets large, then ni and nm are very nearly identically distributed,
so the probability that ni < nm goes to 1/2. As r and m get large, the probability
that some ni will be smaller than nm goes to 1.
Thus, in any sample GBIN(P, k), we expect to see some Ai other than Am elimi-
nated first. Since all of Ai’s votes then go to Am, Am will with high probability never
be eliminated and will be the winner.
4.4.9 Positional Scoring Rules
By Theorem 4.4.1, we know that any positional scoring rule defined by 〈α1, . . . , αm〉
where α1 > α2 is not 1-statistically robust. Here, we consider the case where α1 = α2
(so the rule is not unanimous), but the score vector consists of at least three distinct
values.
Theorem 4.4.12. Let ~α = 〈α1, . . . , αm〉 be any positional scoring rule with integer
αi’s such that α1 > αi > αm for some 1 < i < m. Then the positional scoring rule
defined by ~α is not 1-statistically robust.
Proof. We will show that a counterexample exists for any ~α for which α1 > αi > αm
for some i.
We construct a profile as follows. Start with r copies of each of the m! possible
ballots, for some large r. Clearly, for this profile, all m alternatives are tied, and each
alternative wins the election with equal probability, 1/m.
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We will show that this profile can be “tweaked” so that in the resulting profile,
all m alternatives are again tied and each win with equal probability. However, the
number of first-choice votes will no longer be equal for all alternatives, so for a sample
of size 1, the alternatives will not all win with equal probability.
The “tweak” is performed as follows. Take a single ballot type b (i.e., a permu-
tation of the alternatives) that has A1 in position 1 on the ballot, A2 in position i,
and A3 in position m. Consider the 6 ballot types obtained by permuting A1, A2, A3
within b (while keeping the other alternatives’ positions fixed). We will change the
number of ballots of each of these 6 types by δ1, . . . , δ6 (the δi’s may be positive,
negative, or zero).
That is, starting from a ballot type A1 . . . A2 . . . A3, we will change the counts of
the following 6 ballot types:
A1 . . . A2 . . . A3 by δ1
A1 . . . A3 . . . A2 by δ2
A2 . . . A1 . . . A3 by δ3
A2 . . . A3 . . . A1 by δ4
A3 . . . A1 . . . A2 by δ5
A3 . . . A2 . . . A1 by δ6
where the “. . .” parts are the same for all 6 ballot types.
In order to keep the scores of A4, . . . , Am unchanged, we require δ1 + . . .+ δ6 = 0.
Next, in order to keep the scores of A1, . . . , A3 unchanged, we write one equation
for each of the three alternatives:
(δ1 + δ2)α1 + (δ3 + δ5)αi + (δ4 + δ6)αm = 0,
(δ3 + δ4)α1 + (δ1 + δ6)αi + (δ2 + δ5)αm = 0,
(δ5 + δ6)α1 + (δ2 + δ4)αi + (δ1 + δ3)αm = 0.
Finally, to ensure that the number of first-choice votes changes (so that the prob-
ability of winning a sample of size 1 changes) for at least one of A1, A2, A3, we add
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an additional equation, δ1 + δ2 = 1, for example.
The 5 equations above in 6 variables will always be satisfiable with integer δi’s.
(The δi’s might be fractional values, but then we will be able to scale all the δi’s by
some multiplicative factor to get integer solutions.) We can choose the replication
factor r to be large enough so that the numbers of each ballot type are non-negative.
Thus, there always exists a counterexample to statistical robustness as long as α1 >
αi > αm.
4.5 Discussion and Open Questions
We have introduced and motivated a new property for voting rules, statistical robust-
ness, and provided some results on the statistical robustness of several well-known
voting rules.
Many interesting open problems and conjectures remain, some of which are given
below.
It may be surprising that plurality (and its complement, veto) and random ballot
are the only interesting voting rules that appear to be statistically robust. Being
statistically robust seems to be a somewhat fragile property, and a small amount of
nonlinearity appears to destroy it.
For example, even plurality with weighted ballots (which one might have in an ex-
pert system with different experts having different weights) is not statistically robust:
this is effectively the same as score voting.
Open Problem 1. Are some voting rules k-statistically robust for large enough
sample sizes k? Many of our non-robustness results are for k = 1. It would be of
interest to determine, for each voting rule and each kind of sampling, for which values
of k statistical robustness holds.
Note that we showed for approval voting that there does not exist a threshold k′ for
which k-statistical robustness holds for k > k′, for any of the three sampling methods.
Conjecture 1. Show that plurality and veto are the only statistically robust voting
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rules among those where each ballot “approves t” for some fixed t, for all three
sampling methods.
Conjecture 2. Show that a voting rule cannot be statistically robust if the num-
ber of distinct meaningfully-different ballot types is greater than m, the number of
alternatives, for all three sampling methods.
Conjecture 3. Show that a voting rule cannot be robust if there are two profiles P
and P ′ that have the same total score vectors, but which generate different distribu-
tions when sampled, for all three sampling methods.
Open Problem 2. Determine how best to use the information contained in a sample
of ballots to predict the overall election outcome (where the entire profile is unknown),
for each voting rule that is not statistically robust. (There may be something better
to do than merely applying the voting rule to the sample.) This type of prediction
may be useful for non-Bayesian post-election audit methods.
Open Problem 3. The lottery-based voting rules studied by Walsh and Xia [59]
of the form “LotThenX” seem plausible alternatives for statistically robust voting
rules, since their first step is to take a sample of the profile. Determine which, if any,
LotThenX voting rules are statistically robust.
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